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DISQUALIFICATION FOR CONFLICTS OF INTEREST AND
THE LEGAL AID ATTORNEYt
MARSHALL J. BREGER*
I. INTRODUCTION
This Article analyzes the effect of doctrinal developments regarding dis-
qualification of counsel for conflicts of interest' on the practice of legal aid. 2
"Conflict of interest" is the term used by lawyers to describe situations in
which an attorney is unable to represent or to continue representing a client
because of a competing allegiance. Although such conflicts may result from
the personal or financial self-interest of attorneys, this Article focuses
t @ 1982 by Marshall J. Breger.
The author would like to thank the officers and staff of The Heritage Foundation
for their innumerable courtesies, not the least of which include a congenial yet
invigorating intellectual environment.
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of Pennsylvania, 1967; B. Phil. (Oxon.), Oxford University, 1970; J.D., University of
Pennsylvania, 1973.
From 1975 through 1978, the author was a member of the Board of Directors of the
Legal Services Corporation, Washington, D.C.
I The literature relating to conflicts of interest is "enormous." O'Dea, The
Lawyer-Client Relationship Reconsidered: Methods for Avoiding Conflicts of Inter-
est, Malpractice Liability and Disqualification, 48 GEO WASH. L. REV. 693, 699
(1980). A review of present conflict of interest doctrine can be found in Develop-
ments in the Law-Conflicts of Interest in the Legal Profession, 94 HARV. L. REV.
1244 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Developments]. See also Aronson, Conflict of
Interest, 52 WASH. L. REV. 807 (1976); Liebman, The Changing Law ofDisqualifica-
tion: The Role of Presumption and Policy, 73 Nw. U.L. REV. 996 (1979); Note,
Motions to Disqualify Counsel Representing An Interest Adverse To a Former
Client, 57 TEX. L. REV. 726 (1979); Note, The Chinese Wall Defense to Law Firm
Disqualification, 128 U. PA. L. REV. 677 (1980) [hereinafter cited as The Chinese
Wall Defense]. A proposed reconceptualization of the doctrine is advanced in
Lindgren, Toward a New Standard of Attorney Disqualification, 1982 A.B.F. RES. J.
421.
2 Many of the ideas on which this Article is based derive from the results of a 1977
survey undertaken with the assistance of Ernest Reynolds III of the Texas Bar to
whom thanks are deservedly proffered. A questionnaire was sent to 300 legal services
programs to determine how they approached conflict of interest problems. Fifty-two
of the offices responded, with 44.67% of those offices sending in fully completed
responses. See Preliminary Report on the Design, Administration, and Data Derived
from a Survey Research Inquiry into Conflicts of Interest Problems Faced by Legal
Service Offices (1977) (on file at the Boston University Law Review) [hereinafter
cited as Survey]. A 1982 review of the files of the Legal Services Corporation suggests
that recent legal services developments have not outdated the survey.
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primarily on those conflicts which arise out of the intrusion of competing
allegiances caused by clients with adverse or potentially adverse interests.
After considering the impact of the conflict of interest dilemma on the
delivery of legal services to the poor, this Article explores whether non-
profit, government-subsidized legal aid organizations should be subject to
the same conflicts rules as the rest of the legal profession. It argues that,
because the fiduciary relationship between lawyer and client demands loy-
alty to one's client, attorneys who represent legal aid clients should be
subject to the same ethical obligations as members of the private bar.
Moreover, this Article argues that, once a legal aid office steps in to provide
legal assistance to the adversaries of conflicted clients, the government owes
a special duty to those conflicted clients and must ensure that they receive
legal representation. It examines several means of providing representation
to conflicted indigents without compromising any ethical obligations. This
Article concludes that some form of private sector involvement in the
provision of legal services to the poor will often be necessary to provide
representation to eligible conflicted clients without compromising the
fiduciary relationship between lawyer and client.3
II. CONFLICT OF INTEREST LIMITATIONS ON THE PRACTICE OF LAW
The ethical boundaries of our discussion of the conflict of interest pros-
criptions on attorneys are set by Canons 4, 5, and 9 of the American Bar
Association (the "ABA") Code of Professional Responsibility (the
"Code"). 4 Canon 5 focuses on the attorney's duty to exercise independent
3 Significant controversy now exists regarding the future of the Legal Services
Corporation and whether the government subsidy for legal aid should flow through a
federal appropriation, tax credits, or other funding sources. The argument of this
paper bears only indirectly on the resolution of that controversy. Conflict of interest
problems will arise regardless of which funding format is utilized.
4 The new ethics code that has been proposed by the ABA, the Model Rules of
Professional Conduct, differs in several respects from the Code of Professional
Responsibility in its treatment of conflicts of interest. See MODEL RULES OF PROFES-
SIONAL CONDUCT (Proposed Final Draft 1981). The proscription on appearances of
impropriety has been eliminated in the new code. Compare MODEL CODE OF PRO-
FESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Canon 9 (1979) with MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL
CONDUCT Rule 1.7 (Proposed Final Draft 1981). Under the Model Rules, an attorney
may not represent "another person in the same or a substantially related matter if the
interest of that person is adverse in any material respect to the interest of the former
client unless the former client consents after disclosure or the information has
become generally known." MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.9
(Proposed Final Draft 1981).
The Model Rules clarify the Disciplinary Rules of Canon 5 by providing that a
lawyer shall not represent a client "if [his or her] ability to consider, recommend or
carry out a course of action on behalf of the client will be adversely affected by the
lawyer's responsibilities to another client ..... Id. Rule 1.7.
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professional judgment on behalf of a client,' and requires that a lawyer
refuse to accept proffered employment if such representation would be likely
to affect this judgment adversely. 6 Canon 4 mandates that attorneys pre-
serve the confidences and secrets of their clients. 7 This duty extends in-
definitely into the future, even after the attorney-client relationship has been
terminated.8 Canon 9 suggests that an attorney must decline employment or
withdraw from representation when the appearance of impropriety exists.9
Courts have been reluctant to require disqualification on this ground alone,
however, and have looked to the facts and circumstances of each particular
case before requiring disqualification solely on this basis.' 0 Once attorneys
have agreed to represent their clients, Canon 7 requires that they represent
those individuals "zealously within the bounds of the law."' 1
Underlying all these proscriptions is the goal of preserving the fiduciary
relationship between attorneys and their clients. This relationship demands
the encouragement and protection of trust,"2 and prohibits attorneys from
disclosing professional confidences or simultaneously representing clients
with differing interests.' 3 Attorneys must remain loyal to their clients and
must place their knowledge and ability at their clients' exclusive command.
This exclusivity cannot be shared with other persons or causes14-one
cannot easily serve two masters at once.
Representation of clients with differing interests may be concurrent or
successive. As the Canons of Professional Ethics, which preceded the pre-
sent code, stated: a "lawyer represents conflicting interests when, on behalf
of one client, it is his duty to contend for that which duty to another client
requires him to oppose."' 5 The proscription extends to interests which
In general, the Model Rules focus specifically on the central problems raised by the
conflicts dilemma-problems which the present Code addresses obliquely if at all.
5 MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Canon 5 (1979).
6 Id. DR 5-105(A).
7 Id. Canon 4.
8 Id. EC 4-6.
9 Id. Canon 9.
10 See, e.g., Silver Chrysler Plymouth, Inc. v. Chrysler Motor Corp., 518 F.2d
751, 753 (2d Cir. 1975).
" MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Canon 7 (1979).
12 Sealy, Fiduciary Relationships, 1962 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 69, 70-71; see also Scott,
The Fiduciary Principle, 37 CALIF. L. REV. 539 (1949).
1 Cinema 5, Ltd. v. Cinerama, Inc., 528 F.2d 1384, 1386 (2d Cir. 1976).
14 Id.; see United States v. Bronston, 658 F.2d 920, 927 (2d Cir. 1981) ("Having
retained the Rosenman Colin firm as their counsel, the BusTop investors were
entitled to the undivided loyalty of its partners."); Agnew v. Walden, 84 Ala. 502,
505, 4 So. 672, 673 (1888) (A retainer "exacts undivided loyalty and allegiance to the
client, equal to that demanded by the veriest despot that ever scourged a people.").
But see Developments, supra note 1, at 1265-70 (critiquing fiduciary model of profes-
sional ethics).
Is ABA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS No. 6 (1937).
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affect the judgment or loyalty of a lawyer to a client, and includes conflict-
ing, inconsistent, diverse, or other interests. 16 Moreover, the representing
attorney's obligation to a client becomes a duty of the entire law firm, not
merely of the attorney; under traditional doctrine the entire law firm is
deemed "tainted" and disqualified if any member of that firm is in a conflicts
situation. 7 Courts are often reluctant to apply this inflexible taint rule in
practice, however, particularly with regard to public defender organiza-
tions."8
Conflict of interest problems are also raised by the successive representa-
tion of adverse parties by the same attorney. The case law makes clear that
an attorney may not represent successive clients with adverse interests
16 MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 5-14 (1979).
17 ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics, Informal Op. 1199 (1971); see also ABA
Comm. on Professional Ethics and Grievances, Formal Op. 104 (1934) (attorney who
shared offices with a police judge could not represent persons arraigned before that
judge); ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics and Grievances, Formal Op. 33 (1931)
("[T]he relations of partners in a law firm are so close that the firm, and all members
thereof, are barred from accepting any employment that one member of the firm is
prohibited from taking."); MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR
5-105(D) (1979). The most recent proposal for the Code adopts a similar view. See
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.10 (Proposed Final Draft
1981).
IS See, e.g., People v. Robinson, 79 Il. 2d 147, 158-59, 402 N.E.2d 157, 161-63
(1979) (rejecting application of per se taint rule in concurrent representation case and
drawing no distinction between attorneys in private practice and those employed by
the state with regard to ethical restraints); People v. Dallas, 85 Ill. App. 3d 153, 405
N.E.2d 1202 (1980) (codefendants not denied effective assistance when represented
by same public defender's office); State v. Bell, 90 N.J. 163, 447 A.2d 525 (1982)
(multiple representation in the same action by different associates of a public defend-
er office does not in itself give rise to a presumption of prejudice); People v.
LaBrake, 28 N.Y.2d 625, 625-27, 320 N.Y.S.2d 242, 243, 269 N.E.2d 33, 33-34 (1971)
(hearing required to determine extent of public defender's participation in a potential
conflict situation); People v. Wilkens, 28 N.Y.2d 53, 56, 320 N.Y.S.2d 8, 10, 268
N.E.2d 756, 757 (1971) ("cannot presume [that] ... complete and full flow of client
information between staff attorneys exists in order to impute knowledge to each staff
attorney within [public defender's] office").
A number of Bar Associations have taken the same position. See, e.g., Mich. State
Bar Ass'n Op. 380 (1979); N.Y. State Bar Ass'n Comm. on Professional Ethics, Op.
533 (1981), Op. 497 (1978), Op. 462 (1977), Op. 419 (1975), Op. 313 (1973); Utah
State Bar Ass'n Op., Feb. 3, 1972, as printed in 0. MARU, Digest of Bar Association
Ethic Opinions, No. 9916 (Supp. 1975).
Other courts have strictly applied the taint rule to public defender organizations.
See Allen v. District Court In and For Tenth Judicial District, 184 Colo. 202, 205, 519
P.2d 351, 353 (1974) (public defender office treated as firm); Roberts v. State, 345 So.
2d 837, 838 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977) (dual representation by public defender held
impermissible); Commonwealth v. Westbrook, 484 Pa. 534, 400 A.2d 160 (1979)
(same holding). See generally Note, Public Defender's Office is a "Law Firm" for
Purpose of Determining Whether Conflict Exists in Representation of Codefendants,
5 FLA. ST. U.L. REv. 442 (1977).
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when the matter involved is "substantially related" to the former represen-
tation. 19 With respect to such matters, courts have traditionally established
an irrebuttable presumption that the former client has communicated
confidences that could injure the attorney's subsequent representation of the
adverse client. 20 An attorney may represent a new client on an unrelated
matter, however, even if that matter would hurt the former client. 2 1
Conflict of interest problems thus exist when the representation of ad-
verse interests raises the spectre of disloyalty to present or former clients.
Too strict a definition of what constitutes a conflict, however, would unduly
limit attorney and client mobility. For this reason, the adverse interest
prohibition is limited to the representation of adverse legal interests, and
does not include positional conflicts, 22 which occur when two clients have
differing political or ideological views, or economic or legal interests which
affect each other adversely. 23 Of course, attorneys occasionally refuse to
involve themselves in positional conflicts for financial or ideological rea-
sons. 24 However, such representation is not precluded on ethical grounds.
'9 T. C. Theatre v. Warner Bros. Pictures, 113 F. Supp. 265, 268 (S.D.N.Y. 1953);
see MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.9(a) (Proposed Final Draft
1981) ("[A] lawyer who has represented a client in a matter shall not thereafter...
[r]epresent another person in the same or a substantially related matter if the interest
of that person is adverse in any material respect to the interest of the former client
unless the former client consents after disclosure."). Of course, the definition of an
"adverse interest" and a "substantially related matter" are open to judicial interpre-
tation. See Silver Chrysler Plymouth, Inc. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 518 F.2d 751,
754-57 (2d Cir. 1975) (attorney not disqualified when subject of litigation not substan-
tially related to prior representation); NCK Org. v. Bregman, 542 F.2d 128, 132-35
(2d Cir. 1976) (substantial relationship held to exist when there is some evidence of
the possibility of past improper disclosure by counsel). Compare Trone v. Smith, 621
F.2d 994, 998 n.3 (9th Cir. 1980) (subject matter of suits must be related), with
Government of India v. Cook Indus., Inc., 569 F.2d 737, 739-40 (2d Cir. 1978) (issues
of suits must be related).
20 See Realco Servs., Inc. v. Holt, 479 F. Supp. 867, 871 (E.D. Pa. 1979) (attorney
disqualified when "might have acquired" confidential information during previous
litigation substantially related to issue in present suit). The Realco court explicitly
rejected the argument that both clients must be involved in the same cause of action.
Id.
21 For example, a private attorney who once represented a bank in a reorganiza-
tion case could later represent a debtor suing the same bank on a truth-in-lending
matter. A lawyer could also sue a former commercial client on behalf of another
client on a products liability claim.
22 See O'Dea, supra note 1, at 701 n.32.
23 To some extent, the ethical problem is definitional. At the point where a
positional conflict may have an actual effect on representation or otherwise "taint"
the trial process, such a conflict would rise above being "positional" only, and
continued representation would become improper.
24 Thus, an attorney who represents corporations with large environmental con-
cerns may ethically lobby on behalf of environmental groups such as the Sierra Club
1982] 1119
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The extent to which consent vitiates an ethical conflict is unclear. The
Code provides that a lawyer may represent conflicting clients if both clients
consent to dual representation and "it is obvious that [the lawyer] can
adequately represent the interest of each." 2 5 A number of cases have upheld
the validity of dual representation when informed consent has been ob-
tained. 26 Before consent will be deemed "informed," however, the client
must be made aware of all the facts related to, the possible effects of, and the
legal implications which will result from the proposed dual representation. 27
Nonetheless, the question remains as to whether consent, even when
informed, should be sufficient to abrogate conflict prohibitions. The answer
depends on whether this prohibition is seen as a client-centered rule,2 8 or a
rule designed to enforce the integrity of the judicial system. Although there
is debate over the extent of the client's role in the legal decision-making
process,2 9 the Code explicitly provides that "the authority to make decisions
is exclusively that of the client and, if made within the framework of the law,
such decisions are binding on his lawyer." 30 At the same time, the lawyer's
for strong environmental control legislation. See N. REDLICH, PROFESSIONAL RE-
SPONSIBILITY: A PROBLEM APPROACH 26-27 (1976); see also T. MORGAN & R.
ROTUNDA, PROBLEMS AND MATERIALS ON PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 44
-(1976) (conflict between pro bono and regular client).
25 MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 5-105(C) (1979). Consent
must follow full disclosure to the client. Id.
26 See, e.g., City of Cleveland v. Cleveland Elec. Illuminating Co., 440 F. Supp.
193, 205 (N.D. Ohio 1976) ("[I]t is axiomatic that the client's right to object to an
attorney's allegedly adverse representation may be waived."), affd mem. 573 F.2d
1310 (6th Cir. 1977). Recently the waiver concept has been extended to prospective
conflicts. See Kennecott Copper Corp. v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., No. 78-1295
(S.D.N.Y. Apr. 11, 1978) (enforcement of retainer agreement permitting counsel to
represent its other clients against consenting client in any future litigation). Several
commentators have discussed the prospective waiver issue. See, e.g., O'Dea, supra
note 1, at 725-30; Note, Prospective Waiver of the Right to Disqualify Counsel for
Conflicts of Interest, 79 MICH. L. REV. 1074 (1981).
27 Financial Gen. Bankshares, Inc. v. Metzger, 523 F. Supp. 744, 771 (D.D.C.
1981). The attorney has an affirmative duty to provide such disclosure. IBM Corp. v.
Levin, 579 F.2d 271, 282 (3d Cir. 1978). Mere knowledge of the fact of adverse
representation does not constitute full disclosure. Financial General Bankshares, 523
F.Supp. at 771.
28 One commentator has described the consent issue as flowing from a libertarian
model of lawyer-client relations based on the "free choice of one's associates and the
terms of one's associations." Developments, supra note 1, at 1262. This model
requires that "both parties act voluntarily and with full understanding of the issues
about which they are bargaining," and that the client "has enough information
validly to consent to a given set of terms." Id. at 1262-63.
29 See generally Martyn, lnJbrmed Consent in the Practice of Law, 48 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 307 (1980); Spiegel, Lawyering and Client Decision-making: In-
formed Consent and the Legal Profession, 128 U. PA. L. REV. 44 (1980).
30 MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-7 (1979).
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responsibility to serve a client is restricted by the attorney's conception of
professional integrity. 3 '
Conflict of interest constraints were not developed solely to protect the
client. The role of consent in vitiating conflicts highlights vital interests of
the judicial system and of society in general. Clients cannot consent away
conflicts. They can only declare that they are prepared to live with them.
The courts have a nondelegable responsibility to ensure that members of the
bar adhere to proper ethical standards in the management of cases. 32 A
client's consent will not always resolve the doubts as to the propriety of dual
representation. Court thus may always prohibit dual representation, even
when consent is given, when irreconcilable problems are anticipated,33 or it
appears that the interests of both parties cannot be adequately rep-
resented.3
4
31 Many commentators argue that attorneys should not be forced to make deci-
sions that conflict with their personal subjective codes of professional conduct, client
desires notwithstanding. See, e.g., Spiegel, supra note 29, at 117.
32 Kesselhaut v. United States, 555 F.2d 791, 794 (Ct. Cl. 1977).
33 The multiple representation of clients by one lawyer in a criminal case has
raised analogous problems. Although recognizing that the right to counsel of one's
own choosing is a significant goal, courts have held that no absolute right to a
particular counsel exists. United States ex rel. Carey v. Rundle, 409 F.2d 1210, 1215
(3d Cir. 1969) (due process satisfied if party given "fair and reasonable opportunity
to obtain particular counsel"), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 946 (1970). This is true both for
retained counsel, see, e.g., Maynard v. Meachum, 545 F.2d 273, 278 (1st Cir. 1976)
(delay may vitiate right to choose counsel); Ross v. Reda, 510 F.2d 1172, 1173 (6th
Cir. 1975) (attorneys must be licensed to practice in particular jurisdiction), cert.
denied, 423 U.S. 892 (1975), and for appointed counsel, see, e.g., Drumgo v.
Superior Court, 8 Cal. 3d 930, 934, 506 P.2d 1007, 1009-10, 106 Cal. Rptr. 631, 635
(Constitution does not guarantee appointment of attorney requested by defendant),
cert. denied, 414 U.S. 479 (1973); Diehl v. State, 200 So. 2d 240 (Fla. 1964) (insolvent
attorney not constitutionally entitled to choose own counsel). See generally Tague,
An Indigent's Right to the Attorney of his Choice, 27 STAN. L. REv. 73 (1974). Thus,
when the court determines that multiple representation will result in the ineffective
assistance of counsel, such representation should be barred even though it may
constrain a defendant's freedom of choice. Since sixth amendment considerations do
not apply in the civil arena, courts should balance the competing interests carefully to
ensure that consent does not lead to a travesty of the trial process.
Nonetheless, this does not mean that clients should not be given a chance to
express their own preferences. See J. P. Foley & Co. v. Vanderbilt, 523 F.2d 1357,
1360 (2d Cir. 1975) (Gurfein, J., concurring) (Although "that expression will . . .
not be binding on the court," the client's desires, albeit not dispositive, should be
carefully weighed.). As the 5th Circuit has urged: -[A] court should be conscious of
its responsibility to preserve a reasonable balance between the need to ensure ethical
conduct on the part of lawyers appearing before it and other social interests, which
include the litigant's right to freely chosen counsel." Woods v. Covington County
Bank, 537 F.2d 804, 810 (5th Cir. 1976).
34 See, e.g., In re Holmes, 290 Or. 173, 619 P.2d 1284 (1980) (dual representation
19821
BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 62: 1115
III. THE CODE OF ETHICS AND LEGAL AID PRACTICE
A. The Legal Aid Lawyer as Attorney of Last Resort
It has been generally argued that present ethical doctrine constitutes a
unified code of ethics which applies to the entire profession. 35 According to
this view, an indigent person seeking assistance from a legal services office
forms the same lawyer-client relationship with its staff of lawyers as any
other client who retains a firm to represent him.3 6 Ethical committees37 and
courts3" have held traditional conflicts doctrine applicable to Legal Aid
Societies. Moreover, the Legal Services Corporation Act explicitly provides
that legal aid attorneys must respect the Code of Professional Responsibility
and the high standards of the legal profession. 39
improper despite full disclosure and consent when attorney cannot adequately repre-
sent interests of each client).
35 The Preliminary Statement to the Model Code of Professional Responsibility
declares that "the Disciplinary Rules should be uniformly applied to all lawyers,
regardless of the nature of their professional activities." MODEL CODE OF PROFES-
SIONAL RESPONSIBILITY preliminary statement (1979).
Commentators have asserted that the Code of Professional Responsibility is appli-
cable to public interest and legal service attorneys. See Cole, Freedom of Choice and
Group Legal Services, 9 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 671, 678 (1975); Stoehr, Are Legal
Aid Societies, Lawyer Referral Services, and Group Legal Services Adequate Under
the Code of Professional Responsibility?, 51 NEB. L. REV. 486, 486 (1973).
36 ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 334 (1974).
An attorney is also prohibited from giving advice to a person who is not represented
by counsel, except for the advice to secure legal assistance, if the interests of such
person are or have a reasonable possibility of conflicting with the interests of the
attorney's client. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-104(A)(2)
(1979). The suggestion that a pro se litigant secure counsel may of course offer the
indigent little assistance, since the only source of counsel may be legal aid. See
generally Meltsner & Schrag, Report from a CLEPR Colony, 76 COLUM. L. REV.
581, 618 (1970).
37 The ABA Committee on Professional Ethics has noted in an informal opinion
that the ethical standards concerning the representation of differing interests apply to
legal aid offices in the same way as they do to other lawyers. ABA Comm. on Ethics
and Professional Responsibility, Informal Op. 1233 (1972); see N.Y. State Bar Ass'n
Comm. on Professional Ethics, Informal Op. 102 (1969) (concluding that the opera-
tion of legal aid office is in the nature of legal partnership).
38 See, e.g., Borden v. Borden, 277 A,2d 89, 92-93 (D.C. 1971) (rejecting dual
representation by legal aid office). But see MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CON-
DUCT Rule 1.10 comment (Proposed Final Draft 1981) ("Lawyers employed in the
same unit of a legal service organization constitute a firm, but not necessarily those
employed in separate units.").
39 Legal Services Corporation Act of 1974, 42 U.S.C. § 2996(b) (1976). The
Corporation is expressly forbidden from interfering with the Code's mandates. 42
U.S.C. § 2996e(b)(3) (1976); H.R. REP. No. 93-247, 93d Cong., 2nd Sess. 2, re-
printed in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 3872, 3873.
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The consequences of applying strict conflicts rules in the legal aid context
have led some to suggest that traditional doctrine ought not to apply when
clients are represented by legal aid attorneys. 40 Unlike the clients of private
lawyers, the clients of legal aid attorneys seek their particular legal represen-
tatives less out of choice than out of necessity. 4 1 Clients of private attorneys
generally can seek aid elsewhere should they be unable to receive represen-
tation from a particular attorney because of a conflict of interest. Conflicted
legal aid clients, however, are likely to go without legal assistance if a legal
aid office cannot represent them, as significant alternatives to legal aid and
supplemental modes of legal representation for indigents exist in only a few
areas of the country .4 2 This unavailability of alternative representation effec-
tively bars conflicted clients from access to legal counsel, making the legal
aid attorney their lawyer of last resort. 43 This conflicts dilemma also creates
problems for legal services providers, who may feel obligated to represent
those who cannot afford legal representation, 44 and for society at large, since
40 See, e.g., ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Informal Op.
1309 (1975) (two legal aid offices paid through central fund could represent opposing
clients).
41 1979 Legal Servs. Corp. Ann. Rep. at 10 (cited in Developments, supra note 1,
at 1398 n.6). The income eligibility limits for legal services clients are set by local
programs themselves but may not be more than 125% of the official poverty threshold
as defined by the Office of Management and Budget. See 45 C.F.R. § 1611.3(b)
(1981). For 1982, this threshold figure was $5,850 for an individual and $11,625 for a
family of four. See Fed. Reg. 25,148 (1982) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. § 1611 app.
A); see also 45 C.F.R. § 1611.4 (1981) (additional bases for eligibility); Breger, Legal
Aid for the Poor: A Conceptual Analysis, 60 N.C.L. REV. 262, 315 (1982).
42 See Developments, supra note 1, at 1398.
43 For example, in Nevada, the Nevada Indian Legal Services Program was barred
from representing an individual Indian in an action against an Indian tribe previously
represented by the program. See State Bar of Nevada, Ethics Op. 5 (Oct. 5, 1976);
see also ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Informal Op. 1233
(1972).
44 The question of the legal aid lawyer's duty to an unrepresented indigent adver-
sary raises complex theoretical issues. The traditional view maintains that although
attorneys
should endeavour to inform the adversary of his right to counsel... [and] inform
the judge or tribunal of that individual's need for a lawyer[,] [o]nce the lawyer
has done all he can to find representation for his opponent, he should conduct
himself as zealously on behalf of his client as always.
J. WEISS, NEIGHBORHOOD PRACTICE AND LEGAL ETHICS 2 (1978); see also MODEL
CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 2-25 (1979); id. ED 7-18. The proposed
Model Rules of Professional Conduct do not presently require an attorney to advise
an indigent of the existence of free legal services or require an attorney to advise an
unrepresented party to seek the assistance of counsel before the attorney takes any
action. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.6 (Proposed Final
Draft 1981). It is still likely that many legal aid attorneys feel some ambiguity about
vigorously representing a client against an unrepresented indigent, taking full advan-
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the impossibility of providing legal services to all needy clients raises ques-
tions about the distribution of welfare goods.
The impact of this conflicts dilemma on legal aid practice is substantial,
and affects cases of both concurrent and subsequent representation. Domes-
tic relations matters involving divorce, child custody, and parental neglect
cases constitute over one-third of the legal aid caseload. 45 In many in-
stances, both parties to domestic relations actions will be income-eligible
and dependent upon legal aid for representation. Courts, however, have
traditionally forbidden both legal aid offices 46 and private law firms from
representing both parties to a divorce, 47 even if both parties consent.4 8 This
tage of this lack of representation. See supra note 36. This problem must be differ-
entiated from that faced by legal aid attorneys who represent "helpless" clients
because the ethical problems there turn on how to effectuate duties toward your
"own" client, not your adversary. See Gassel, Levy-Warren & Weiss, Representing
the Helpless: Toward an Ethical Guide for the Perplexed Attorney, 5 W.S.U. L. REV.
173 (1978).
45 Legal Services Corporation, Characteristics of Field Programs Supported by
the Legal Services Corp. Start of 1982-A Fact Book 7 (Feb. 1982) (29.5% of cases
closed in 1981 were family problems); accord Stumpf, Law and Poverty: A Political
Perspective, 1968 Wis. L. REV. 649, 699 ("Since the first neighborhood office opened
its doors, family problems (primarily divorce) represented the largest single category
of cases handled, 35%.").
46 Borden v. Borden, 277 A.2d 89, 92-93 (D.C. 1971) (two legal aid attorneys from
same office prohibited from representing adverse parties in divorce case).
47 See, e.g., Gregory v. Gregory, 92 Cal. App. 2d 343, 349, 206 P.2d 1122, 1126
(1949) (husband and wife should be represented by separate counsel in property
settlement negotiations); King v. King, 52 111. App. 3d 749, 752-53, 367 N.E.2d 1358,
1360 (1977) (improper for attorney to represent wife in maintenance action while
maintaining attorney-client relationship with husband); In re Frith, 361 Mo. 98, 233
S.W.2d 707 (1950) (attorney suspended for, inter alia, representing both husband and
wife in divorce annulment suits); In re Braun, 49 N.J. 16, 18-19, 227 A.2d 506, 507-08
(1967) (attorney disqualification based on initial consultation with both husband and
wife); In re Gilchrist, 208 A.D. 497, 203 N.Y.S. 720 (App. Div. 1924) (suspension of
attorney who represented both husband and wife in divorce action despite consent of
both parties); In re Bryant, 242 Or. 562, 410 P.2d 824 (1966) (permanent suspension
for, inter alia, representation of husband and wife). Disqualification may even result
when the prior representation was not connected with material issues. See Sokoloff
v. Sokoloff, 82 Misc. 2d 797, 799-800, 371 N.Y.S.2d 106, 108-09 (Fam. Ct. 1975). But
see Note, Attorney Mediation of Marital Disputes and Conflict of Interest Consid-
erations, 60 N.C.L. REV. 171 (1981) (representing both parties in divorce to mediate
settlement agreement a permissible alternative to litigation); Simon, The Growth of
Divorce Mediation, Nat'l L.J., Aug. 30, 1982, at I (bar associations developing
ethical standards to regulate burgeoning mediation practice).
48 See N.Y. State Bar Ass'n Comm. on Professional Ethics, Formal Op. No. 258
(1972). See generally Note, Possible Effect of Conflict of Interests in a Divorce
Action Arising from Only One Attorney Obtaining the Decree, 15 ALA. L. REV. 502,
504-10 (1963).
Dual representation has only been permitted in rare instances. See, e.g., Klemm v.
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prohibition rests on the assumption that the interests of the spouses in
divorce proceedings necessarily differ. 49 In domestic relations matters, the
legal aid agency thus will be unable to represent a large number of otherwise
eligible clients; as many as one-half of the parties in divorce proceedings
may be left without counsel. This situation understandably exerts pressure
on the legal community to relax conflicts rules and to develop structural
mechanisms for securing counsel for conflicted indigents from alternative
sources.5 0
Conflicts problems are prevalent in matters involving subsequent rep-
resentation as well. Legal aid lawyers are limited in their ability to accept
proffered cases by the requirement that they respect client confidences after
the termination of the attorney-client relationship. If a legal services office
represents a husband in a bankruptcy proceeding, that office may not be able
to represent the client's wife in a subsequent divorce action involving a
dispute over her husband's finances.5' Similarly, if a poor landlord is sued by
an indigent tenant who is represented by a legal aid attorney, that landlord
may be excluded from access to legal aid in later litigation involving the
tenant.
The impact of conflict of interest proscriptions is particularly great when
legal aid offices undertake group representation. Federally funded legal
services programs historically have represented many indigent groups.
Under current regulations, legal aid offices may represent groups when the
majority of the members of the group are themselves eligible for legal
services. 5 2 A legal aid lawyer may also represent individual indigents whose
Superior Ct. of Fresno County, 75 Cal. App. 3d 893, 900-01, 142 Cal. Rptr. 509,
513-14 (1977) (joint pro bono representation permitted in no-fault divorce when
parties advised of legal rights and right to independent counsel and no support or
custody issue left unresolved); Halvorsen v. Halvorsen, 3 Wash. App. 827, 479 P.2d
161 (1970) (trial court has discretion to permit dual representation should such
representation be reasonable). But see Fla. Bar Comm. on Professional Ethics, Op.
No. 71-45 (1971) (representation of both spouses improper when real conflict
existed). See generally Note, Simultaneous Representation: Transaction Resolution
in the Adversary System, 28 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 86, 104-09 (1977).
49 See Callner, Boundaries of the Divorce Lawyer's Role, 10 FAM. L.Q. 389, 394
(1977) (situations in which husband and wife have similar interests exceptionally
rare); accord N.Y. State Bar Ass'n Comm. on Professional Ethics, Op. 258 (1972)
(substantial likelihood of conflict inherent in all matrimonial problems).
50 See Matter of Smiley, 36 N.Y.2d 433, 453, 330 N.E.2d 53, 65, 369 N.Y.S.2d 87,
104 (1975) (Fuchsberg, J., dissenting) (usual legal assistance mechanisms are in-
sufficient in conflicts cases).
5S1 See Letter from Stuart Clio, Keystone Legal Services, to Legal Services Corpo-
ration (Oct. 10, 1980).
52 See 45 C.F.R. § 1611.5(c) (1982). Group representation has been defended on
the ground that it is cost-effective and that through such representation one serves
the ideological concerns of poor people and raises their group consciousness. See E.
JOHNSON, JUSTICE AND REFORM 231, 248-84 (1974).
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cases raise group concerns. A legal services program that represents a
community group in one action may be barred by traditional conflicts rules
from representing another group with differing interests in a subsequent
action.
Legal aid attorneys may serve as house and general outside counsel for
poverty organizations such as the National Welfare Rights Organization.
53
As house counsel, a legal aid lawyer provides expertise not merely on
specific, discrete legal matters, but on a wide range of indeterminate issues.
An attorney who serves as house counsel to one group may not ethically be
able to switch allegiance to an adverse group. The organization through the
door first may effectively exclude all other client organizations with compet-
ing perspectives from access to legal aid. One segment of the poor thus may
be able to use legal counsel to pursue their aims, while all other segments
will not.
This dilemma would be less serious if the poor could be viewed as a
"monolithic client ' 5 4 with common across-the-board interests. Under this
view, the interests of one group of poor people would never conflict with
those of other indigents, as the underlying interests of all poor persons would
coincide. Unfortunately, this myth of homogeneity cannot survive close
scrutiny. 5  The heterogeneity of interests among eligible clients reflects the
rich diversity of cultural and ethnic life in America.5 6 Cleavages between
members of the poverty community exist, and can be based on ethnic or
religious differences, 5 7 on the neighborhood orientation of poverty com-
53 The National Welfare Rights Organization was a major organizational client of
the Center for Law and Social Policy, a legal services support center. See Legal
Services Corporation, Support Center Study vol. I, 1-5 (Feb. 16, 1976). The National
Tenants Organization was a client of the National Housing Law Project. Id. at 8-3.
54 Rhode, Why The ABA Bothers: A Functional Perspective on Professional
Codes, 59 TEX. L. REV. 689, 697 (1981).
55 Conflicts exist between social groups even when both groups represent interests
normatively favored by liberals or conservatives. See, e.g., T. MORGAN & R.
ROTUNDA, supra note 24, at 48.
56 See generally Ehrlich, Legal Services for the People, 30 CATH. U.L. REV. 483
(1981). It has been argued that all poor people have certain across-the-board interests
common to them as poor persons and that legal services should focus priorities on
those common concerns. Id. at 491-92. Such interests include government welfare or
food stamp policies, national health insurance, and proposals for redistribution of
income or power. However, divergencies exist even where one would often assume a
homogeneous position within the poverty community. For example, competing
health insurance schemes may allocate benefits and burdens disproportionately be-
tween poor and near poor, Jewish elderly and black children, rural and urban poor.
The poor will naturally have conflicting interests in these matters.
Diversity is most apparent when pluralist politics use interest group representation
as a criteria for allocating federal and state funds. R. DAHL, PLURALIST DEMOC-
RACY IN THE UNITED STATES: CONFLICT AND CONSENT 397-404 (1967); see also
S. MAKIELSKI, JR., PRESSURE POLITICS IN AMERICA 193-94 (1980); A. HOLTZMAN,
INTEREST GROUPS AND LOBBYING 36-39 (1966).
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munities, or even on disputes as to strategy and tactics within specific
poverty groups. 58 Conflicts among the poor are inevitable and unavoidable'
create competition for the federally funded legal services that are available.
B. Preserving the Fiduciary Relationship Between Legal Aid Lawyer and
Client
Because of the legal aid lawyer's special position as attorney of last resort,
the argument may be made that traditional conflicts rules should not apply in
the legal aid setting. The unremitting caseload pressure generated by the
extensive client base of the legal aid practice, and exacerbated by the
continuing scarcity of available fiscal resources, 59 creates incentives for
downgrading the quality of services to ensure that all clients receive some
representation. The time pressures involved in administering these
caseloads make it difficult for legal aid lawyers to represent every client fully
and adequately. Still, many legal aid attorneys find it difficult to turn eligible
persons away at the door. 60 Moreover, the emotional character of many
-1 In Boston, for example, poor whites perceive their interests as diverse from
indigent blacks. See Morgan v. Kerrigan, 509 F.2d 580, 583-84 (1st Cir. 1974), cert.
denied, 421 U.S. 963 (1975). In New York, poor Jews concerned with community
cohesion are at odds with the Puerto Rican community over redistricting and hous-
ing. See United Jewish Orgs. of Williamsburgh, Inc. v. Carey, 430 U.S 144 (1977);
Wilder v. Sugarman, 385 F. Supp. 1013 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), refiled sub nom. Wilder v.
Bernstein, 499 F. Supp. 980 (S.D.N.Y. 1980). See generally P. BERGER & R.
NEUHAUS, To EMPOWER PEOPLE: THE ROLE OF MEDIATING STRUCTURES IN PUB-
LIC POLICY 31, 33 (American Enterprise Institute 1977).
For a discussion of ethnicity as a fragmenting factor among the poor, see A.
GREELEY, ETHNICITY IN THE UNITED STATES: A PRELIMINARY RECONNAISANCE
(1974); M. LEVY & M. KRAMER, THE ETHNIC FACTOR (1972); M. NOVAK, THE RISE
OF THE UNMELTABLE ETHNICS (1972); P. WEED, THE WHITE ETHNIC MOVEMENT
AND ETHNIC POLITICS (1973). The ethnic identity movement has been criticized as
adding to social fragmentation and discord. See A. MANN, THE ONE AND THE
MANY: REFLECTIONS ON THE AMERICAN IDENTITY 42 (1979).
58 See, e.g., Bell, Serving Two Masters: Integration Ideals and Client Interests in
School Desegregation Litigation, 85 YALE L.J. 470 (1976); Clark, The Lawyer in the
Civil Rights Movement-Catalytic Agent or Counter-Revolutionary?, 19 KAN. L.
REV. 459 (1979).
19 This resource scarcity has led legal aid services to reduce caseload levels
through the use of priority schedules, a practice which has now been mandated by
Congress. Legal Services Corporation Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2996f(a)(2)(C) (Supp. IV
1980). For a general discussion of the different approaches to priority setting, see
Breger, supra note 41.
60 This tendency to give all indigents some, although perhaps inadequate, service
is premised both on philosophical notions of equal treatment and subjective re-
sponses to the strain of legal aid practice. See generally Bellow, Reflections on
Case-Load Limitations, 27 LEGAL AID BRIEFCASE 195 (1969); Silver, The Imminent
Failure of Legal Services for the Poor: Why and How to Limit Caseload, 46 J. URB.
LAW 217 (1969). But see Getzels, Legal Aid Cases Should Not Be Limited, 27 LEGAL
1982] 1127
BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 62: 1115
legal aid cases and the lack of programmatic standards of quality control
increase the likelihood that attorneys will prefer subordinatingfu/l represen-
tation to more, thus increasing the pool of clients served. 6 1 Even partisans of
legal aid have recognized that the legal aid practice contains elements of
bureaucratic " people-processing. ' 62 This tension between quality represen-
tation and open access has led some commentators to discuss the possibility
of reducing "the care and energy given to any particular case." ' 63 These
sentiments suggest that a firm adherence to the fiduciary relationship be-
tween lawyer and client may be ill-advised when juxtaposed against the
possibility that otherwise eligible clients will be left unrepresented.
Although this argument may be superficially appealing, it is, in fact,
misguided. Legal aid clients should receive the same quality of legal care as
private clients, and should be ensured the loyalty and confidentiality which
AID BRIEFCASE 203 (1969). The pro-limitation position assumes that caseload lim-
itations justify priority setting by class of case. See ABA Comm. on Ethics and
Professional Responsibility, Informal Op. 1359 (1976).
61 This underrepresentation perspective is a more sophisticated version of the
caseload limitation position, discussed supra at note 60. Professors Bellow and
Kettleson suggest that in its most extreme form the underrepresentation position
results in:
(I) permitting caseloads to rise . . . ; (2) providing routine, minimal service,
primarily oriented to defusing crises; (3) trading off affirmative actions or
claims-often without a careful assessment of their worth ... ; (4) not informing
clients of the minimum level of service they are receiving or of the range of
affirmative actions available to them; and (5) making no effort to bring to the
client's attention legal matters on which the client has not requested assistance.
Bellow & Kettleson, From Ethics to Politics: Confronting Scarcity and Fairness in
Public Interest Practice, 58 B.U.L. REV. 337, 355 (1978).
61 Some legal services partisans have been among the first to admit that their
programs are "demoralized and unfocused," Letter from Deborah McCutcheon and
Paul R. Collier II1, 14 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 134, 135 (1980), and have raised
concerns about "the calcification and the increasingly bureaucratic orientation of
some programs." Krakow, Bleeding the Poor Again, 14 CLEARINGHOUSE REV.
1031, 1034 (1981); see also M. LIPSKY, STREET-LEVEL BUREAUCRACY 120-22, 150
(1980).
In the traditional model of attorney-client relations, attorneys work for clients on a
fee-for-service basis. As a result, they will remain sensitive to the needs, desires, and
even idiosyncracies of their clients. In contrast, legal services lawyers are largely
salaried employees. They are employed by local programs and work only indirectly
for clients. Although third-party payment mechanisms should not affect the
attorney-client relationship, they will eliminate many economic incentives that usu-
ally derive from that relationship. As a result of this lack of economic nexus,
attorneys will have less need to please clients and thus may treat them in a bureau-
cratic mode.
63 See Bellow, Legal Aid in the United States, 14 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 337, 342
(1980). This phenomenon stems from the philosophical notion that publicly-funded
legal aid programs should not turn anyone away who seeks service. See Bellow &
Kettleson, supra note 61, at 355; Silver, supra note 60, at 223.
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is characteristic of the attorney-client relationship. Various forms of
caseload control can be profferred to alleviate the tensions inherent when
scarcity exists.6 4 The quality of legal services to the poor cannot be reduced
without sacrificing the rights of indigent clients and compromising the integ-
rity of our legal institutions.
Furthermore, the quasi-public position of legal aid attorneys as recipients
of federal funds affects their responsibility in service allocation decisions. 61
Although legal aid providers must follow principles of equity in allocating
their services, this obligation does not dictate that indigents be represented
when attorney resources are not available to provide quality representation.
Since legal services are not divisible, limited resources cannot be shared
equally among all potential claimants. Equity in allocation does not mean
inadequate service for all but rather requires that the methodology of case
selection and resource allocation recognize the right of each individual to the
64 The ABA has approved priority-setting by local programs to restrict caseloads
so that the quality of services is not reduced. See ABA Informal Op. No. 1359 (1976);
see also ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 334
(1974); Finman & Schneyer, The Role of Bar Association Ethics Opinions in Regula-
ting Lawyer Conduct: A Critique of the ABA Committee on Ethics and Professional
Responsibility, 29 UCLA L. REV. 67, 108-09 (1981). Priority-setting as a method of
resource allocation is discussed in Breger, supra note 41, at 330-36. Priority-setting
refers to the decision to provide service according to specific preferred areas of the
law. Although priority-setting has been defended as a quality control device, it has a
hidden agenda-it serves not only to limit the legal aid caseload to a manageable
number of clients, but also to determine the categories of cases that a legal aid office
will accept. Caseloads can also always be controlled merely by restricting intake
whenever quality representation would be threatened 'by the size of an office's
clientele.
Other avoidance mechanisms can be used to reduce client intake. Eligible clients
whose cases are low priorities can be asked to wait months for appointments. In
certain cases, such as domestic relations matters, a limited number of appointments
can be given out each month and others can be told to queue up next month.
Neighborhood offices can be shut down, increasing the opportunity costs, such as
time and effort, for clients who seek legal services.
65 Legal aid lawyers represent the means through which the state fulfills its
commitment to provide legal services to the poor. Since they are supported by public
funds, legal aid attorneys possess certain responsibilities. The legal status of legal aid
employees is more complex. See Spokane County Legal Servs., Inc. v. Legal Servs.
Corp., 614 F.2d 662 (9th Cir. 1980) (Legal Services Corporation not federal agency
for purpose of suits under Administrative Procedure Act); White v. N. La. Legal
Assistance Corp., 468 F. Supp. 1347, 1350-51 (W.D. La. 1979) (local legal aid
organizations are autonomous in employment decisions since not agents of the Legal
Services Corporation); Gurda Farms, Inc. v. Monroe County Legal Assistance
Corp., 358 F. Supp. 841, 847 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (legal aid attorney funded by Office of
Economic Opportunity considered a federal officer for purpose of statute permitting
removal to federal court).
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good being distributed. The fiduciary relationship between attorney and
client must not be sacrificed on the altar of caseload pressure.
The nature of the legal aid office's clientele underscores the need for
maintaining a high standard of fiduciary loyalty and trust. The legal aid client
traditionally lacks experience in legal matters and in relating to the judicial
bureaucracy. This putative lack of legal competence 66 places clients at a
distinct disadvantage in controlling and guiding their attorneys' activities.
Although legal aid attorneys are not the only members of the bar who serve a
weak and generally dependent clientele, this condition must be recognized
when exploring the application of ethical rules to legal aid practice. The legal
aid attorney represents clients who cannot easily articulate their desires.
This places great power in the hands of legal aid attorneys in organizing their
clients' affairs. Strict adherence to fiduciary principle is essential for ensur-
ing that indigents are treated fairly and retain confidence in the legal sys-
tem. 67
Moreover, the lack of economic motivation characteristic of legal aid
work does not eliminate the threat that an attorney's independent judgment
will be impaired by representing clients with conflicting interests. Since legal
aid attorneys are generally salaried employees whose livelihoods are not
dependent upon the particular cases they accept, 68 they lack the economic
impetus to prefer one client over another. 69 However, any claim that this
66 The term "legal competence" is drawn from J. CARLIN, J. HOWARD & S.
MESSINGER, CIVIL JUSTICE AND THE POOR 61-63 (1966), and suggests that the poor
fail to use the legal system effectively because they lack knowledge about and
psychological confidence in the legal system. In contrast, the legally competent
person is aware that he possesses rights and takes action by turning to the legal
system to vindicate those rights. But see M. ZANDER, LEGAL SERVICES FOR THE
COMMUNITY 289 (1978) ("[T]he kind of [legal] problem seems to cause much greater
differences in lawyer use than the kind of potential client.").
67 The legal aid client's lack of legal confidence arguably could justify a firm
adherence to the Canon 9 requirement that attorneys refuse to accept or continue
employment when the mere appearance of impropriety exists. See infra notes 72-85
and accompanying text.
68 The increased resort to court-awarded attorneys' fees to augment legal aid
budgets has introduced an element of economic calculation in the case selection
process. Thus, courts have acknowledged that community legal services must take
the likelihood of obtaining attorneys' fees into account in rationing litigation re-
sources. See Shadis v. Beal, 520 F. Supp. 858 (D.C. Pa. 1981).
69 Although the fee-for-service view is the dominant mode of attorney compensa-
tion, many attorneys today work in the salaried sector, either for the government or
for corporations. The percentage of lawyers working as salaried employees in private
industry increased from 5% of the profession in 1951 to 7.8% in 1960 to 9.4% in 1970.
See Galanter, Megalaw and Mega-Lawyering In The Contemporary United States, in
SOCIOLOGY OF DOCTORS AND LAWYERS (R. Dingwall & P.S.C. Lewis eds. 1982).
The number of house counsel increased from 11,000 in 1951 to 50,000 in 1979.
Schwartz, The Reorganization of the Legal Profession, 58 TEX. L. REV. 1269, 1275
(1980) (quoting Nat'l L.J., Feb.4, 1980, at 1, col. 4). Even many attorneys in private
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lack of economic motivation permits a relaxation of conflicts constraints
reflects a narrow view of human nature. Economic incentives are not the
only pressures on professional autonomy. Legal aid lawyers may have
ideological interests in the results obtained by their representation. Indeed,
to sustain their interest in a case, 70 many legal aid lawyers find it necessary
to "redefine ...an individual client's problem . . .so that it impinges on
greater interests." ' 71 Attorneys may have personal or emotional interests in
the results of lawsuits they undertake. The fighting spirit required in zealous
representation may, and arguably should, bias an attorney's judgment. The
mere lack of economic contingencies in legal aid work, therefore, does not
justify the relaxation of traditional conflicts doctrine.
C. Redefining the Boundaries of the Conflicts Proscription
A tension thus exists between the need to preserve the fiduciary relation-
ship between lawyer and client and the special obligations of the legal aid
attorney to the poverty community as lawyer of last resort. The primacy of
the fiduciary principle to the legitimacy of our legal institutions mandates
that the fiduciary relationship between attorney and client not be compro-
mised, particularly when the clients lack legal competence. Care must be
taken, however, to ensure that disqualifications are not compelled when they
would not further the goal of preserving this relationship. The extraordinary
result of disqualification-the inability of the conflicted client to obtain legal
counsel-dictates that disqualifications be avoided unless absolutely essen-
tial to this goal. If the fiduciary relationship would not be compromised by
permitting dual or subsequent representation, disqualification arguably
should not be mandated.
1. The Legal Aid Attorney and the "Appearance of Impropriety"
Canon 9 unequivocally mandates that an attorney avoid even the appear-
ance of impropriety. Yet, courts traditionally have been reluctant to disqual-
ify attorneys if their representation of a client would violate solely this
firms work as associates on a salaried basis. In fact, only 10% of all 1978 law
graduates were self-employed one year after graduation. Id. at 1274-75.
70 A recent study of the legal aid lawyer stressed the continuing tension between
the "expectations of routine that are presented by the local environment," id. at 115,
and the "symbolic transformation of moral pressures toward routine into themes of
transcending significance," id. at 113. For the legal aid attorney to maintain involve-
ment in his work requires his participation in reform litigation, id. at 108, even in a
discouraging environment, id. at 113. The need to fight routinization, however, is
never-ending and attorneys must "intensify their involvement in order to sustain it."
Id. at 118. Routinization is one cause of the "burn-out" phenomenon and the
attendant "turnover" crisis in legal aid. See Katz, Lawyers for the Poor in Transi-
tion: Involvement, Reform and the Turnover Problem in Legal Services Programs, 12
LAW & Soc'y REv. 275 (1978).
71 J. KATZ, POOR PEOPLE'S LAWYERS IN TRANSITION 107 (1982).
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proscription.7 2 The proposed Model Rules of Professional Conduct would
eliminate the appearance of impropriety alone as a basis for attorney disqual-
ification.7 3 The view adopted by the drafters of the Model Rules illuminates
the fact that appearances must be treated gingerly when used to justify
disqualification, particularly when a conflicted client might otherwise be
unable to obtain legal counsel.
Appearances of impropriety should carry some weight when those who
may perceive impropriety are already cynical about perceived restrictions
on their opportunities for justice because of indigence or social and eco-
nomic disadvantage. Appearances alone, however, do not frustrate the
fiduciary relationship between attorney and client. The prohibition on ap-
pearances of impropriety should give way when rigid adherence to the rule
would result in an inability to deliver legal services to the poor effectively.
A legal aid attorney may be disqualified on the basis of the Canon 9
proscription in a number of factual settings. Disqualification for appearances
alone occurs perhaps most frequently in instances when differing interests
exist between members of legal aid program boards of directors and their
staff attorneys. Conflicts between board members and other legal aid attor-
neys cannot be equated with the usual conflicts between two staff attor-
neys,7 4 since the relationship between a board member and a staff attorney
differs substantially from that of two legal aid lawyers.7" Specifically, board
members, unlike staff attorneys, do not enter attorney-client relationships
with program clients.7 6 Members of a board of directors do not participate in
72 See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
73 MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.7 (Proposed Final Draft
1981).
74 See ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 334
(1974); see also N.Y. State Bar Ass'n Comm. on Professional Ethics, Op. 490 (1978).
71 Estep v. Johnson, 383 F. Supp. 1323, 1326 (D. Conn. 1974).
76 Under present law, the Board of Directors of a legal services program must be
composed of at least 60% attorneys who are members of the bar of the state in which
legal assistance is to be provided. Legal Services Corporation Act, 42 U.S.C. §
2996f(c) (Supp. V, 1980). At least one third of the Board members must be eligible
clients or their representatives. 45 C.F.R. § 1607.3(d), (e) (1982). Attorney members
are selected by current members or appointed by bar associations or other commu-
nity groups depending on the organizational framework used by the local programs.
They serve without compensation. Attorney members may also be selected to be
client representatives. If the representative is not an eligible client, only eligible
clients may participate in the selection process. Legal Services Corporation Opinion
Letter (Aug. 14, 1978) [1978-80 Transfer Binder] Pov. L. REP. (CCH) 27,360. See
also 45 C.F.R. § 1607.3(c) (1982) (attorneys shall be selected from or designated by
organizations of eligible clients).
Congress recently increased regulation of local boards of directors by requiring
that the majority of the members of such boards be attorneys appointed by the
governing bodies of local bar associations that represent a majority of attorneys
practicing in the recipients' service area. Legal Services Corporation Continuing
Appropriations Resolution, Pub. L. No. 97-276, 96 Stat. 1186 (1982); see also 47 Fed.
Reg. 50,659-10 (1982) (proposing amendment to 45 C.F.R. § 1607.3).
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policy decisions of the legal aid office that involve individual clients.7 7
Although board members are responsible for the welfare of a legal aid
program in a fiduciary sense, 78 they are not generally involved in hiring
decisions and do not review the progress of specific litigation matters. Little
likelihood exists that client confidences will be revealed, or that the loyalties
of the client or the board members will be divided.
Despite the lack of any real threat to the fiduciary principle, the represen-
tation by a board member of an interest adverse to a client of the legal aid
office may create a significant appearance of impropriety. 79 The board's
authority over staff attorneys' salaries and questions of promotion8 ° could
reasonably raise the inference of subtle influence by members of the board
on a staff attorney's action. It is also conceivable that, absent the imposition
of screening mechanisms, a director could have access to otherwise confi-
dential information. 8 1
Some courts have eliminated the adverse impact of disqualification on
conflicted indigents based solely upon appearance by requiring the Board
77 ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 334 (1974).
This requirement derives from the need to eliminate conflicts, and is not inherent in
the operation of a legal aid society.
To satisfy the need for total confidentiality, a board member should not have
access to confidential client files, even when those files contain only documents that
are publicly available. See ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility,
Formal Op. 334 (1974).
78 See, e.g., Knepper, Liability of Corporate Officers for Debts of Financially
Troubled Corporations, 81 CoM. L.J. 389, 390 (1976).
79 In Estep v. Johnson, 383 F. Supp. 1323 (D. Conn. 1974), the court found that a
board member should either give up a case or resign from a local board of directors if
he represented an interest sufficiently adverse to a staff attorney to make them
"adversaries in the same litigation." Id. at 1325. Although the court recognized that
there is less opportunity "for shared knowledge by the board member of the affairs of
the staff attorney's client" than in a law firm, it found the appearance of impropriety
to be substantial. Id.
Several state bar associations also have been wary of the appearance of impropri-
ety when a board member represents interests adverse to a legal aid staff attorney.
See, e.g., N.Y. State Bar Ass'n Comm. on Professional Ethics, Op. 489, at 3 (1978)
("Certainly, in the minds of the organization's indigent clientele, the [legal aid] staff
could not reasonably be deemed free of compromising influences if the lawyer-
members of its board were to accept retainers from relatively affluent adverse
parties.").
80 Estep v. Johnson, 383 F. Supp. 1323, 1326 (D. Conn. 1974).
81 ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 345 (1979).
The Committee does not require such screening procedures, but "urges that the
Board member's firm provide screening procedures such as those suggested in [ABA
Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility] Formal Op. 342 so that the Board
member has no knowledge and no access to knowledge concerning the particular
litigated matter." Id.
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members to resign when their interests conflict with those of legal aid
clients.82 This rule severely restricts the ability of members of the private
sector to participate on local boards. Members of large corporate law firms
will often be prohibited from serving on boards of legal aid societies since
conflicts will inevitably occur.8 3 The impact of this requirement is especially
acute in rural areas where there are generally fewer attorneys.8 4 Large law
firms may also be discouraged from contributing money to legal aid work for
fear of accusations that the money will be used to influence a program's case
selection process.8s
Disqualification of board members based upon the appearance of a conflict
thus exacts a heavy price on local legal aid societies without serving the
purpose of protecting the fiduciary relationship between attorneys and
clients. Appearances should not be enough to require the disqualification of
board members when little likelihood exists that actual conflicts will occur.
2. The Legal Aid Attorney and Positional Conflicts
Legal aid practitioners sometimes refuse to enter into positional conflicts
even though such conflicts are not proscribed by the Code. Examples of
positional conflicts include a legal aid office's representation of indigent Ku
Klux Klan members,8 6 of landlords, or of individual indigents with interests
that differ from those of community groups traditionally favored by the
office. 87 Legal aid agencies that avoid entering into positional conflicts may
82 Estep v. Johnson, 383 F. Supp. 1323, 1325-27 (D. Conn. 1974). Should a conflict
exist, it is unclear why it is the board member who should withdraw. If the board
member or his law firm has a continuing relationship with an adverse client, the
conflict is caused by the legal aid attorney, not the board member. Although the court
in Estep found that it must always be the director who resigns, because the impact of
withdrawal would have a far more serious impact upon the staff attorney than upon
the director, id., the Legal Services Corporation does not take this position. See
Letter from Toby Sherwood, Asst. Gen. Counsel, Legal Servs. Corp., to Stan
Zahorsky, Cent. Minn. Legal Servs. (June 20, 1979) ("Each client must consent to
continued representation by his or her lawyer [but this does not] mean that a board
member's client who objects to the situation may force the legal services staff to
withdraw, nor ... that a legal services client may force a board member to withdraw
or resign from the board.").
83 If many board members are directly or indirectly involved with clients who have
interests adverse to legal aid clients, such a rule might make it difficult to satisfy the
requirement that 60% of all board members be local attorneys. See Letter from Dean
Nance, Delaware County Legal Assistance Ass'n, to Legal Servs. Corp, (May 2,
1979).
84 See Alaska Bar Ass'n Comm. on Professional Ethics, Op. 79-4 (1979).
85 Some commentators have argued that appearances of impropriety may be
obviated in some cases by making full disclosure to the client and gaining informed
consent. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 345
(1979).
86 See, e.g., Winter, Klan Defense Raises Legal Aid Furor, 67 A.B.A. J. 28
(1981).
87 Such a conflict arises when a legal services program considers whether to accept
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base their decisions on the judgment that such representation would di-
minish their acceptability among members of the poverty community.8 8 This
concern is political rather than ethical,8 9 and flows from a belief that attor-
neys should not take on cases which offend their existing client base. 90
Legal aid offices should not be permitted to deny representation to oth-
erwise eligible clients in order to avoid positional conflicts. The legal aid
lawyer's position as attorney of last resort should create a duty to accept
clients who do not present ethical conflicts regardless of whether positional
conflicts may result. The Code does not prevent legal aid attorneys from
entering into positional conflicts and the definition of an "adverse interest"
should not be permitted to extend to nonethical conflicts. 9 1 Legal aid law-
yers should not be permitted to avoid representing eligible clients solely on
this basis. 92
3. Consent as a Means of Vitiating Conflicts in Legal Aid Offices
The number of conflicted and thus potentially unrepresented clients can be
substantially reduced by permitting dual representation when both parties
give their informed consent. However, legal aid clients may not be able to
as a client an otherwise eligible individual who wishes to oppose affirmative action in
an employment context.
88 Letter from S.R. Ellis, Dir., Parkdale Community Legal Servs., Toronto,
Canada, to Toronto City Exec. Comm. (Aug. 11, 1975) (discussing Parkdale legal
clinic's refusal to represent indigent landlords in eviction actions).
s9 The legal aid society claimed that such representation would be "destructive"
of its efforts in "establishing and maintaining an image of a place that represents the
interests of low-income people." Id. Underlying this contention is the belief that the
goal of legal aid is to serve as "general counsel to the poor." See infra notes 97-99
and accompanying text.
90 Law firms who engage in pro bono litigation often take a broad view of what
constitutes a conflict of interest and reject cases not because of a direct conflict but
because of possible embarrassment to paying clients. As one commentator has noted,
"many firms represent very large businesses and corporations and will think twice
about taking a consumer case or an environmental case, only because they say those
cases are posing economic threats to potential clients." Tubor, The Pro Bono
Debate: Flap Over Working For Free, Nat'l L.J., June 15, 1981, at 1.
91 The refusal to accept an indigent client because of a positional conflict also
conflicts with the access rights theory of legal aid. See infra notes 102-07 and
accompanying text.
92 But see G. BELLOW & B. MOULTON, THE LAWYERING PROCESS 249-50 (1978),
Bellow & Kettleson, supra note 61, at 349. Professor Bellow argues that favored
community groups could be allowed to screen potential legal aid clients. This would
prevent cases inconsistent with the community groups' interests from being rep-
resented by legal aid. Implementation of Bellow's analysis would mean the denial of
representation of eligible clients on the basis of political, as well as ethical grounds.
Id. at 343-53.
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give free and informed consent. 93 Waivers by clients of public defenders
frequently have been disallowed because of judicial skepticism over the
reliability of consent when given by unsophisticated clients. 94 The legal aid
client, having no place else to go to seek legal representation, is not really
free to withhold such consent. The signing of an informed consent form
presents the indigent with a Hobson's choice and in no way ensures that a
client has given his or her blessing to dual representation. 95 Consent should
not be relied upon as a viable or realistic means of reducing the number of
unrepresented clients in conflicts cases.
IV. THE LEGAL AID LAWYER'S RESPONSIBILITY TO CONFLICTED CLIENTS
A legal aid attorney should not be disqualified from representing a client or
accepting an otherwise eligible client when the fiduciary relationship be-
tween the two would not be adversely affected by dual representation. This
relationship must be protected at all costs, however, despite the position of
the legal aid attorney as the lawyer of last resort. To protect this relation-
ship, legal aid offices, when confronted with a conflicts situation, may
choose to reject both parties or to serve only one of the parties seeking legal
assistance. In the latter situation, rather than informing the rejected client
that the office is unable to provide representation because of ethical consid-
erations, the legal aid office should ensure alternative means of legal rep-
resentation.
93 See, e.g., N.J. Advisory Comm. on Professional Ethics, Op. 126, reprinted in 91
N.J.L. J. 257 (Apr. 25, 1968).
94 This skepticism predominates in the criminal law context. See, e.g., United
States v. Bernstein, 533 F.2d 775, 788 (2d Cir. 1976) (consent does not vitiate
conflict); United States v. Gains, 529 F.2d 1038, 1044 (7th Cir. 1976) (trial court has
duty to ensure that waiver is deliberate and made with understanding of conflict and
its implications); Campbell v. United States, 352 F.2d 359, 360 (D.C. Cir. 1965) (trial
judge must assure himself that defendant's consent was informed). This problem has
traditionally been considered in the context of waivers of sixth amendment rights.
See, e.g., Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 462-64 (1938) (Determination of"intelli-
gent waiver" depends on particular facts of case, "including background, experi-
ence, and conduct of accused."). It is highlighted in the conflicts context by the
relative esoteric nature of the issues at stake. See United States v. Garafola, 428 F.
Supp. 620, 623-24 (D.N.J. 1977) ("[The] average defendant cannot possibly under-
stand fully and completely" the implications of dual representation.).
95 One might argue that legal services clients are unable to give free and informed
consent because of factors connected with their indigency. Thus, any consent which
is given should be held void. An analogy to informed consent to medical treatment is
relevant here. See Epstein & Lasagna, Obtaining Informed Consent: Form or Sub-
stance, 123 ARCHIVES OF INTERNAL MED. 682-88 (1969); Ingelfinger, Informed (But
Uneducated Consent, 287 NEW ENG. J. MED. 465 (1972).
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A. Case Selection Criteria for Selecting Between Two Conflicting Clients
There are two methods by which legal aid offices may select which of two
conflicting clients it will represent. A legal aid office may select clients on
utilitarian grounds, accepting that individual whose representation will best
serve the interests of the poor. The office also may select between conflicting
clients on the basis of temporal priority. Underlying these case selection
perspectives are two alternative theoretical models upon which the alloca-
tion of legal aid services may be based-a social utility model and a model
based on principles of access rights. 96
1. The Social Utility Approach
The utilitarian method of case selection is an offshoot of the social utility
model of legal aid distribution. Under this model, the goal of the legal aid
office should be to serve as " 'general counsel' to the poor." 97 Cases should
always be selected on the basis of their propensity to maximize the position
of the poor as a group. Eligible clients would be given priority if their
problems are of social significance, if their cases provide an efficient means
of aggregating a large number of complaints, or if the individuals involved
are sufficiently important to the poverty community. 98 Under this view, the
legal aid lawyer should refuse to represent indigent clients if their legal needs
diverge from those of the poor generally. 99
A practical approximation of this social utility approach to allocating
scarce resources among eligible clients is the priority-setting process man-
dated by the Legal Services Corporation Act Amendments of 1977.100 This
process attempts to provide legal representation in a manner consistent with
96 See Breger, supra note 41, at 344-60; see also J. Gordley, Variations on a
Modern Theme, in TOWARD EQUAL JUSTICE: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF LEGAL
AID IN MODERN SOCIETIES 77-132 (M. Cappelletti, J. Gordley & E. Johnson eds.
1975) (distinguishing legal aid as a "juridical" right from legal aid as a "welfare"
right).
97 See H. SACKS, LEGAL SERVICES CORPORATION: A PLAN FOR THE FUTURE 5
(adopted Mar. 6, 1981) ("Legal services must be judged on the extent to which they
address the needs of significant segments of the poor and not only on actions with
respect to specific clients.").
98 Under this approach, the provision of legal services to the poor is less a good in
itself than an instrumental goal whose value derives from the good achieved through
the benefits provided.
99 Breger, supra note 41, at 344-52.
100 Legal Services Corporation Act Amendments of 1977, 42 U.S.C.
§ 2996f(a)(2)(C)(i) (Supp. IV 1980) ("[R]ecipients, consistent with goals established
by the Corporation, [must] adopt procedures for determining and priorities for the
provision of such assistance. ... ); see also Breger, supra note 41, at 311. These
priorities are set by the Board of Directors of each local program. See H.R. REP. No.
310, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 10-11, reprinted in 1977 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
4503, 4512-13.
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the desires of the poverty community. Through priority-setting, those clients
whose legal problems have a low programmatic priority can be rejected
systematically, thus permitting the legal aid office to represent those cases
which have been given priority in program resource allocation.
An individual legal aid program could arguably rely on the same ideologi-
cal criteria by which it makes its initial case selection to choose between
opposing parties seeking legal assistance. A legal aid office could represent
the party that best reflects the use of community resources, and whose
representation is thus ideologically more compatible with the program's
selection criteria. An office could choose to give priority to claims brought
by groups traditionally perceived to be poor. For example, if an indigent
tenant and landlord sought representation in the same matter, the legal aid
office could choose to accept the tenant. Similarly, if a battered wife sought a
divorce from her indigent husband, the program could refuse to serve the
husband.
The utilitarian model also enables legal aid programs to choose between
opposing applicants at the same priority level. Thus, in the case of two
tenants, the legal aid program could examine the claims of each similarly
situated applicant and could again choose that client whose cause would
maximize the position of the poor generally. Under the social utility view of
legal aid, therefore, conflicts can be resolved by accepting the party that
has a greater claim to the resources of the legal aid office. 10 '
2. The Access Rights Position-Temporal Priority of the Client
One non-utilitarian approach to case selection in a conflicts context fo-
cuses on the temporal priority of indigent claimants. Underlying this method
of case selection is the access rights theory of legal aid, which requires the
state to provide legal assistance to individuals wishing to make effective use
of society's dispute resolution processes.10 2 Under an access rights ap-
proach, the legal aid lawyer is the attorney of individual clients rather than of
the poor generally. 10 3 This view prohibits the selection of clients based on
the moral or social worth of their claims, and stresses the equal right of all
individuals to have those interests that they consider important vindi-
101 Within the social utility model, an act-utilitarian approach may be distinguished
from a rule-utilitarian approach. An act-utilitarian approach would require that every
resource allocation decision be premised on what is best for the poverty community.
In a rule-utilitarian approach, a program would allocate resources according to what
it considered most beneficial to the long range interests of the poor and would refrain
from making ad hoc changes. Under a rule-utilitarian approach, a legal aid program
might conceivably choose an access rights conflicts approach depending on its
assessment of the best interests of the poor. In contrast, the act-utilitarian position
would require continual determinations of which side to accept in a particular
conflicts case.
102 See Breger, supra note 41, at 287.
103 Id. at 294-97, 350-51.
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cated. 10 4 Under this model, the first client through the door would, in most
circumstances, be served first.
In a conflicts setting, a legal aid office applying an access rights method of
case selection should accept the first client who requests representation and
should reject conflicted clients who subsequently apply for aid.105 Temporal
priority is presently the basis for selecting clients in cases of subsequent
representation, as the presumption that confidences have been transmitted
by the previous client prohibits accepting a subsequent client on a substan-
tially related matter. 0 6 In cases of both simultaneous and subsequent rep-
resentation, the impact of a temporal priority selection scheme on potential
recipients of legal aid is particularly great when a legal aid office serves as
house counsel to a community group or represents a class over a wide range
of issues. By accepting this organization or class as a client, the legal aid
office may be closing its doors to a substantial portion of the poverty
community which may have interests that differ from the represented
group. ' 0
7
B. The Government's Special Obligation to Conflicted Indigents
Both the utilitarian and temporal priority methods of case selection leave
the unrepresented indigent in a precarious position. Had the party accepted
by the legal aid office been denied representation, both parties to the lawsuit
would most likely have lacked counsel, because of the position of the legal
aid lawyer as attorney of last resort. The party chosen by the legal aid office
not only has received the benefit of counsel at the expense of the govern-
ment, but has deprived his or her adversary of the opportunity for a two-
104 Id. at 295-96.
105 The problem is misrepresented in Developments, supra note 1, at 1402 n.29,
which suggests that the "first in time is first in right" logic of legal ethics "produces a
systematic bias in favor of past and present clients over future ones." That difficulty
is caused by the Canon 4 obligation that an attorney protect client confidences. The
problem of temporal priority is unavoidable since whoever gives an attorney confi-
dences, including strangers and potential clients, creates constraints for the attorney.
106 See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
107 The applicability of this doctrine becomes questionable when the contact
between the attorney and the indigent consists only of brief interaction or discussion.
Attorneys in the United States are not duty bound to accept as a client every person
who seeks advice. Absent the transmission of confidences, an attorney may ignore
temporal priority in client selection when choosing between two clients who serially
seek assistance. Of course, precisely when the provision of advice becomes an
attorney-client relationship is a complex question. See, e.g., Westinghouse Elec.
Corp. v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 580 F.2d 1311, 1316-17 (7th Cir. 1978) (explicit consent
to attorney-client relationship is not essential to its formation); United States v.
Constanzo, 625 F.2d 465, 468 (3d Cir. 1980) ("[T]he attorney-client relationship is
not dependent upon . . . the execution of a formal contract.").
1982] 1139
BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 62: 1115
sided pro se battle. 0 8 The conflicted indigent, who may not have chosen to
bring the suit, has been left worse off because of government action.
The government should have an obligation to repair the balance between
the represented and conflicted clients. A conflicted client has a special claim
to representation that takes precedence over other claims for legal assis-
tance.109 The government should provide representation for conflicted indi-
gents prior to expending resources to represent any other indigent person. If
an individual is sued by a plaintiff represented by a legal services attorney,
that individual-if otherwise eligible for legal aid-should receive the next
available quantum of legal assistance provided by the government.
The position of a conflicted indigent may be viewed as analogous to that of
defendants sued by the state. Since these defendants do not voluntarily
initiate the need for legal assistance, their claims to legal assistance should
arguably take priority. The problem is aggravated when a defendant is
incarcerated as in Payne v. Superior Court of L.A. County, 10 in which the
California Supreme Court held that state to be constitutionally required to
108 Breger, supra note 41, at 354-55.
109 The equity argument for state responsibility to conflicted parties may be
analogized to the more developed "fairness doctrine" in the broadcasting and public
utility area. See Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 369-70, 377 (1969)
(radio and television broadcasters required to present adequate and fair coverage of
both sides of public issues). But see Miami Herald Publishing v. Tornillo, 418 U.S.
241, 256-59 (1974) (state statute requiring newspaper to provide free space to candi-
dates whose characters have been assailed held unconstitutional). See generally
Harrison, Public Utilities in the Marketplace of Ideas: A 'Fairness' Solution for a
Competitive Imbalance, 1982 Wis. L. REV. 43, 49-64, 73 (public utilities should be
held to fairness standard in speech because of state regulated control over scarce
resources). Under the fairness doctrine, the federal government, which monopolizes
access to the airwaves and regulates utilities, may require broadcasters and utilities
to provide opportunities for opposing viewpoints to be heard. This focus on limited
resources with the concomitant government involvement in resource allocation sug-
gests some of the equity problems presented in government subsidy of legal services.
In the legal services context, this state monopoly will make it unlikely that parties
will be able to secure counsel absent state assistance. As one commentator stated,
"the state creates and allocates a limited number of natural monopoly 'soapboxes.'"
Id. at 59.
This argument is extremely relevant for legal service allocation in the event of
disputes between poverty groups over social reform. In such cases, by subsidizing
one sector of the poor, the state has provided an advocate for particular political and
social views as well as a litigator for particular disputes. As a result, the functional
result of a local program's case selection policy is for the state to abandon the
neutrality between ideological viewpoints and enter, albeit in the legal arena, into a
partisan fray. The significance of the fairness analogy must be seriously considered in
allocating resources among poverty groups.
1'0 17 Cal. 3d 908, 919, 924-26, 553 P.2d 563, 573, 576-77, 32 Cal. Rptr. 405, 413,
416-17 (1976). But see Hunt v. Hackett, 36 Cal. App. 3d 134, 138-39, 111 Cal. Rptr.
456, 458 (1973) (no general right to appointed counsel).
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provide counsel for an indigent prisoner incarcerated in the state peniten-
tiary after the state denied his request for release from jail to prepare and
argue his case pro se. Thus, California was required to provide counsel to
indigent prisoners irrespective of its general legal aid policy. 1  The Califor-
nia Supreme Court also has held that an indigent defendant in a paternity
proceeding must be provided with government appointed counsel when the
state appears as a party or on behalf of the plaintiff.1" 2
Defendants do not choose to use the judicial process to vindicate per-
ceived wrongs. They are forced into using the legal system and must default
if they lack functional access to the courts. When defendants are placed at a
distinct disadvantage by action of state or federal government, appointment
of counsel has been held essential to fundamental fairness." 3 Although the
analogy between conflicted indigents and defendants sued or incarcerated by
the state is by no means exact, one common theme exists: state intervention
should not be permitted to skew a litigant's position in relation to an adver-
sary. Fairness and equity considerations demand that the state provide
appointed counsel to the party whom it injures through its intervention in the
litigation process.
C. Accommodating the Special Duty to Conflicted Clients
The special duty owed a conflicted client dictates that once clients are
accepted, their adversaries must be accepted as well. The legal aid office
thus has the option of accepting or rejecting both parties. Although either
choice is feasible, application of the case selection models to this decision
suggests that representation of both parties is the more appropriate choice in
the conflicts situation.
1. The Avoidance Position-Reject Both Parties
Of course, the legal imbalance between the two indigents in a conflicts
case could be eliminated if the legal aid office rejected both prospective
clients instead of choosing one indigent to represent. 1 4 Such an alternative
I'' See Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 828-32 (1977) (states must provide prison-
ers with law libraries or adequate legal assistance); Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483,
487-90 (1969) (state may not prohibit inmates from giving legal assistance to other
prisoners if no other source of legal assistance is provided).
11 Salas v. Cortez, 24 Cal. 3d 22, 35, 593 P.2d 226, 234, 154 Cal. Rptr. 529, 537
(1979); accord Reynolds v. Kimmons, 569 P.2d 799, 801-03 (Alaska 1977) (due
process requires appointment of counsel for indigent paternity defendant).
13 See Salas v. Cortez, 24 Cal. 3d 22, 30-32, 593 P.2d 226, 231, 154 Cal. Rptr. 529,
534-35 (1979) (defendant at "distinct disadvantage" in paternity suit).
114 Some commentators have argued that legal services offices should be prohib-
ited entirely from representing indigents and poverty groups in lawsuits directed
against another portion of the poverty community. See Minutes of Legal Services
Corporation Board of Directors Meeting, App. B5-6 (Oct. 7-8, 1977) (statement of
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presents a convenient resolution to the conflicts dilemma by simply avoiding
government-fostered inequity between parties. It is unhelpful, however, in
those cases of concurrent representation in which the conflict does not
emerge until after representation is undertaken.1 15 Similarly, in all cases
involving subsequent representation, conflict cannot be avoided by rejecting
both parties since one client has already received representation.
The avoidance position is consistent with the social utility model only in
limited instances, and directly conflicts with the access rights model. Avoid-
ance is acceptable on utilitarian grounds only if the claim of the third party
who receives representation in lieu of both conflicted indigents has a.higher
priority than those of the parties denied representation. 1 6 In general, how-
Professor Marvin Schick) (dispute over allocation of legal aid resources between
ethnic groups). The fact that both clients of a legal aid office are indigents in a
conflicts setting would require rejection of both plaintiff and defendant. At a mini-
mum, local programs would be required to examine the possible adverse effect on the
poor resulting from such litigation. Id.
The prohibition on representing indigents in matters adverse to the poverty commu-
nity is based on the belief that such representation violates the program's purpose as
defined by Congress. The legislative history of the Legal Services Corporation Act
does not adequately address this issue. See H.R. REP. No. 247, 93d Cong., 2d Sess.
1-4, 6-12, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 3872, 3873-75, 3877-83
(Legal Services Corporation established as independent program, free from political
interference, and funds should not be used to further the interests of particular groups
in the poverty community). Although this position is clearly inconsistent with the
access rights theory of legal aid, see Breger, supra note 41, at 357-60, it does raise
conceptual problems for legal aid case selection by suggesting that legal aid attor-
neys, unlike other lawyers, must consider the consequences of their representation
on third parties in making decisions on whether to accept employment. This view
may be based on the belief that the legal aid lawyer should represent the poor as a
class. See supra note 97 and accompanying text. If this position were adopted,
advocacy for the poor would be seriously limited, due to the heterogeneity of
interests within the poverty community. See supra notes 55-56 and accompanying
text.
"I5 Although it may be unfair to use state funds to help one poor person sue
another while leaving the conflicted client unrepresented, this fairness problem may
not be completely alleviated by a promise to refer away conflicts once litigation
commences. See infra notes 146-86 and accompanying text. The lead time advan-
tage which plaintiffs secure by having counsel available to plan and contour litigation
provides significant benefits to plaintiffs which may not be remedied by referral after
litigation commences. When legal services organizations systematically act as house
counsel for one poverty group at the expense of another, serious questions about bias
in the methodology of representational choice may be raised.
116 See Developments, supra note 1, at 1409 ("[W]hen a legal aid office must
choose between two cases, both of equal importance under the caseload priorities but
one involving a conflict, it is perfectly permissible to take only the conflict-free case,
for it does not present the systemic and client-centered difficulties that may arise in
the conflict-ridden one.").
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ever, caseload priorities will be frustrated if the existence of a conflict is
enough to deny representation to a client who is next under the priority
scheme. 117 Because conflicted indigents whose cases are clearly priorities
may be denied representation because of conflicts of interest, their quantum
of legal aid may then be allocated to clients whose cases are of substantially
less benefit to the poor generally.
The avoidance alternative also directly conflicts with the access rights
model of legal aid distribution. 1 8 Indigents who are next in line under the
legal aid queuing scheme should not lose their places to claimants who
sought legal assistance at a later point in time. Under an equal access view,
legal aid is unfairly distributed if clients are bypassed for representation
solely because a conflict exists. 1 9 Avoidance is therefore an unsatisfactory
means of resolving the conflicts dilemma under one case selection model and
of limited value under the other.
117 Id.
118 As a conceptual approach, this "plague on both your houses" position raises
considerable problems for legal services case selection. The suggestion that it is
"obligatory on anybody who's going to bring... [an] action to take account of the
impact on poor people living in that area, and on their ability to defend against action
of that kind," Minutes of Legal Services Corporation Board of Directors Meeting,
Transcript p. 43 (Oct. 7, 1977) (statement of Nathan Lewin), would suggest that legal
aid attorneys, unlike other attorneys, must consider the consequences of their rep-
resentation on third parties. Lewin correctly points out that prospective clients on
one side of a group dispute may prove fearful of using legal services because of the
simultaneous representation of an antagonistic group. Although probably correct,
this position is no different from the decision of some legal aid organizations not to
represent landlords because of the negative effect this representation might have on
the primary poverty community of tenants.
Such concern for "prospective clients" comes close to the claim that the client of
the legal aid lawyer is the poor as a class. See H. SACKS, supra note 97, at 5. But see
Breger, supra note 41, at 347-52 (reviewing problems in the position that the Legal
Services Corporation should be general counsel to the poor).
19 An example of this trade-off approach to group representation can be found in
recent discussion of class action regulations, as required by the Legal Services
Corporation Continuing Appropriations Resolution, Pub. L. No. 97-276, 96 Stat.
1186, §§ 1012-1122 (1982). In discussing what constraints, if any, should be placed on
class actions, some Board Members urged that such actions should be barred unless
the program director has determined that "the court judgment in the class action will
not result in the expenditure of public funds on a group of eligible clients which is
smaller than the group of all eligible clients which is found within the jurisdiction of
the taxing authority which has raised the public funds being administered." See 47
Fed. Reg. 50,664 (1982) (proposing amendment to 45 C.F.R. § 1617(a)(4)). This
requirement would imply that legal aid attorneys must consider the impact of their
actions on the poverty community as a whole prior to instituting suit.
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2. Ensuring Legal Representation for Both Parties
The balance between both parties in a conflicts case will be preserved if
the legal aid office acknowledges its special responsibility to secure counsel
for conflicted parties once their adversaries receive federally funded legal
assistance.2 0 This position-unlike the decision to reject both parties in
conflict situations-does not conflict with the access rights model and can be
harmonized with the social utility perspective. Under the social utility
approach to case selection, programs make judgments about clients and their
causes. Once a utilitarian judgment has been made, the model does not
recognize any programmatic responsibility to conflicted parties. However,
the model does not prohibit the representation of conflicted clients, particu-
larly when the litigants are on the same priority level, making the choice
between the clients of marginal import to the poor generally. Moreover, a
distinction can be drawn between direct responsibility to accept a case, and
a residual duty, based on the need to preserve the integrity of the adversary
system, to see that a conflicted indigent with a disfavored position receives
some legal service. Although utilitarian considerations might affect the deci-
sion as to who can provide a conflicted client with legal assistance, they need
not prohibit a legal aid office from ensuring that such a client is directed to an
attorney who can provide the necessary service.
The recognition of this special obligation to conflicted clients is also
consistent with the access rights model of legal aid distribution. The decision
to accept a conflicted client, when that client is the next applicant in line for
assistance, will not require an exception to the general queuing scheme.
When the conflicted client is not next in line, exceptions may sometimes be
necessary when emergency considerations may override any one individ-
ual's claim to equal treatment in the distribution of legal aid. Permitting
emergency claims to receive legal assistance before others with valid claims
to such assistance need not promote an arbitrary distribution of scarce
resources.' 2 ' No restriction on the ability to provide representation for
conflicted clients inures from either the social utility or the access rights
limitations on legal aid distribution. Thus, given the choice between rep-
resentation and avoidance, representation clearly would be preferable.
However, this determination creates the problem of how to provide service
to both clients without violating the constraints of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, and thus compromising the fiduciary relationship.
120 This alternative was endorsed by the Washington Superior Court in a case in
which the propriety of a legal aid organization's refusal to represent both indigent
parties in a divorce action was questioned. See In re Holbrook, No. D-89762
(Superior Ct., King Cty., Wash. 1976).
121 Breger, supra note 41, at 295-97.
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V. PROVIDING REPRESENTATION TO THE CONFLICTED INDIGENT
WITHOUT COMPROMISING THE FIDUCIARY RELATIONSHIP
Although legal assistance should be provided to conflicted clients for
whom the legal aid office may be the attorney of last resort, such services
must be offered without compromising the fiduciary protections of the
attorney-client, relationship. In the past, some programs have attempted to
accommodate conflicted clients by developing strategies on an informal, ad
hoc basis for locating alternative sources of counsel. Formal mechanisms
have rarely been established, however, to guarantee legal representation to
conflicted indigents. Several methods of providing such assistance can be
suggested that adhere to traditional ethical obligations and philosophical
considerations of equity and fairness. These strategies can be divided into
two classes. First, the "taint" rule disqualifying an entire law firm from
representing a conflicted client may be reconsidered in the legal aid context
when the use of screening or "Chinese Wall" mechanisms will be adequate
to ensure that the interests of both clients will be protected. Second, a legal
services organization may institutionalize procedures to secure alternate
sources of counsel for conflicted clients. This may be accomplished by a
number of options-requests for court-appointed counsel, use of lawyer
referral programs, use of formal conflicts referral procedures, and adoption
of a judicare method of hiring outside counsel. This last option is perhaps the
most promising means of ensuring that conflicted clients will receive ade-
quate representation.
A. Reinterpreting Conflicts Constraints: The Chinese Wall Solution
The conflicts dilemma may be alleviated by reinterpreting traditional
conflicts rules to permit subsequent and, on occasion, concurrent represen-
tation if such representation can be accomplished without undermining the
ethical principles behind the Code and sacrificing the fiduciary relationship
between lawyer and client. Commentators have suggested that a legal aid
office should not be deemed "tainted" merely because a conflicts situation
exists.' 22 Dual representation should be permitted if barriers between the
conflicted attorney and the rest of the legal aid office can be erected that
will protect the confidences and interests of both clients. Under this
"Chinese Wall" solution, screening mechanisms are employed to isolate a
tainted attorney so that the rest of the law office is not disqualified. Screen-
ing mechanisms have been used effectively in the private sector, primarily in
instances of subsequent representation. In a Chinese Wall situation, all
communication about the conflicted matter between the tainted attorney and
other attorneys at the firm is prohibited. 123 The conflicted attorney is denied
access to relevant documents and court files, and may even be physically
122 See, e.g., Developments, supra note 11, at 1409.
123 See The Chinese Wall Defense, supra note 1, at 678.
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isolated from other members of the firm. 124 A mechanism may also be
established to segregate fees so as to prevent the conflicted attorney from
sharing in the economic benefits resulting from dual representation. 25
In subsequent representation cases, the Chinese Wall functions primarily
to protect the communication of confidences between client and attorney. If
such communications are in fact shielded, the need for disqualification is
vitiated. Although Professor Hazard has criticized the Wall solution as "like
the alleged New England practice of bundling, having neither the credibility
of real prophylaxis nor the dignity of real self-control,"' 126 its use has been
accepted by numerous courts 27 and commentators 28 as a sophisticated
approach to the conflicts problem.
In instances where concurrent representation is desired, the ethical prob-
lems are more complex. An office that represents both parties to a law suit
not only will have problems protecting client confidences, but also may have
difficulties in exercising independent judgment for each client because of
divided loyalties. Law firms will attempt to alleviate this situation by seg-
regating fees, but it is doubtful that this response will ever be satisfactory to
guard against Canon 5 problems in matters involving concurrent representa-
tion. It may be argued that the threat of divided loyalties is less serious in
legal aid offices, because legal services providers are not compensated on a
fee-for-service basis. Yet, the judgment of a legal aid attorney may conceiv-
ably be impaired by ideological or personal considerations. 129 Cases may be
imagined, however, in which the concurrent representation of clients might
not interfere with the fiduciary relationship if adequate screening mecha-
nisms are employed.
Since most legal aid offices operate as law firms employing staff attor-
neys, 3 0 the Chinese Wall seems to offer a superficially attractive solution to
124 Id.
125 Id. This would presumably be the case where pro bono representation is
adverse to a firm's paying clients as well. See Developments, supra note 1, at 1401.
126 G. HAZARD, ETHICS IN THE PRACTICE OF LAW 113 (1978).
127 See, e.g., Armstrong v. McAlpin, 625 F.2d 433 (2d Cir. 1980) (en banc),
vacated, 449 U.S. 1106 (1981). The case was vacated for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction, in accordance with Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risjord, 449 U.S. 368
(1981), holding that an order denying a motion to disqualify opposing counsel in a
civil case is not a final decision.
128 See, e.g., Kramer, The Appearance of Impropriety Under Canon 9: A Study of
the Federal Judicial Process Applied to Lawyers, 65 MINN. L. REV. 243, 262-65
(1980) (approving recent court reliance on screening devices to avoid attorney
disqualifications for the appearance of impropriety); Developments, supra note 1, at
1409-13; The Chinese Wall Defense, supra note 1, at 680.
I" See supra notes 68-71 and accompanying text.
130 There were approximately 4,500 salaried legal services attorneys in 326 legal
services programs funded by the Legal Services Corporation in January 1982. Legal
Services Corporation, Characteristics of Field Programs Supported by the Legal
Services Corp. Start of 1982-A Fact Book 2, 10 (Feb. 1982). There are only 56 local
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the legal aid program's conflicts dilemma. Its application would enable pro-
grams to provide services to conflicted indigents without requiring a restruc-
turing of the present delivery system. The use of screening mechanisms in
legal aid offices was endorsed by the Supreme Court of Alaska in Flores v.
Flores. I3 I However, in this case, involving a child custody proceeding, the
court narrowed its holding to cases in which a "denial of the right to counsel
will necessarily be fatal to the petitioner's case."' 3 2 Nonetheless, several
programs using some aspects ofjudicare. Legal Services Corporation, Private Attor-
ney Involvement: Directions for 1983 and Beyond 4 (Nov. 23, 1982). The bulk of
these programs have only a small judicare component, accounting for a small per-
centage of the total federal funding for legal aid. Under this delivery system the legal
aid attorney is employed on a salaried basis by an autonomous legal services program
which, in most instances, secures funds through the federally-funded Legal Services
Corporation. A few legal aid schemes in other countries use this method of distribu-
tion. For example, one component of the English legal aid scheme is styled
Neighborhood Law Centres which employ salaried solicitors and provide com-
prehensive civil and criminal legal assistance to the surrounding community. See
Legal Advice and Assistance Act of 1972, ch. 50, rewritten and consolidated in Legal
Aid Act of 1974, ch. 4; Lord Chancellor's Office & The Law Society, LEGAL AID
HANDBOOK (1976); see also M. PARTINGTON, PERSPECTIVES ON LEGAL AID 158, 164
(F. Zemans ed. 1979). In 1977-78, two million pounds were allotted to these law
centres, while 85 million pounds were allocated for the traditional judicare approach.
B. GARTH, NEIGHBORHOOD LAW FIRMS FOR THE POOR 63 (1980). By 1980, 31
centres had been established and 30 more were seeking government funding. J. Cooper,
Public Legal Services in Three Countries: A Study of the Relationship Between
Policy and Practice 107-08 (June 1981) (unpublished doctoral dissertation). For case
studies of individual law centres in Brent and Manchester, England and Adamsdown,
Wales, see id. at 134-73, 174-88, 189-203.
In Canada the method of distribution varies by province, and includes salaried staff
models, mixed delivery models, and judicare systems. For a discussion of the means
of legal aid distribution in particular provinces, see Legal Aid Services in Canada
1979180, Justice Information Report (prepared on behalf of the Implementation Work
on Justice Information & Statistics (1981)). The methods of legal aid distribution in
Australia, Holland, Sweden, and the Federal Republic of Germany are discussed in
1 ACCESS TO JUSTICE (M. Cappelletti & B. Garth eds. 1978).
Although a large number of attorneys in the United States are employed on a
salaried basis rather than as "free" professionals, most salaried attorneys work for
the government *or corporations and few are engaged in direct service to the public.
131 598 P.2d 893, 896-97 & n.14 (Alaska 1979) (indigent wife has constitutional
right to court appointed counsel in private custody proceeding in which husband
represented by legal services). The Court stated that "[riegulations might be devel-
oped relating to such matters as record keeping, access to files, supervision, and
physical separation of offices which would be sufficient to ensure that two attorneys
employed by Alaska Legal Services Corporation could represent conflicting positions
in litigation, each having undivided loyalty to his client and fully able to exercise that
independent professional judgment which is required by the Code of Professional
Responsibility." Id. at 896-97.
132 Id. at 896.
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bar associations also have indicated support for the use of the Chinese Wall
to alleviate the effects of conflicts of interest in legal aid offices. 133
Despite the success which the Chinese Wall solution may have in alleviat-
ing the effect of conflict constraints in the private sector, the Wall solution
can be applied to legal aid offices only with difficulty. The successful Wall
requires the complete isolation of a tainted attorney from other lawyers in
thd firm and the restriction of access to all relevant files. Such isolation is
difficult to ensure in a large law firm. It is almost impossible to achieve in a
legal aid office where the permeability of attorneys' roles and small office size
militate against the Wall concept.
Legal aid offices face all the problems of a small firm trying to develop
screening procedures. They also face some special problems as well, created
by the nature of the legal aid office, the character of its firm relations, and
general fiscal limitations. High turnover is endemic to legal aid programs.
Thus, one or two senior attorneys, often including the project director, may
supervise, counsel, and advise a large number of junior attorneys. Attorney
interaction is crucial if a legal aid program is to operate successfully. The
need for constant on-the-job training makes the successful erection of a wall
almost impossible. Moreover, the small size of most legal aid offices calls for
a permeability of roles which hinders the isolation necessary for an effective
wall.
The character of firm relationships also militates against the success of the
Wall solution in the legal aid context. Close collaboration is prevalent among
legal aid attorneys, reflecting the office's general social and intellectual
camaraderie. Many of the lawyers share a sense of common purpose-to
serve the legal needs of the poverty community-and a common political
and social culture. This esprit de corps detracts from the effectiveness of
screening mechanisms, since attorneys must guard against unintentionally
disclosing confidences in social as well as work settings.
In addition, if a wall is to be anything more than a court affidavit, isolating
a tainted attorney will cost money. The legal aid office may have to devise
special filing systems. Attorneys and secretaries may have to reorganize
their work patterns along less efficient lines. Tainted employees must be
provided with separate offices and communal areas must be declared off-
limits to conflicted counsel. Because of their limited funds, legal aid offices
"I For example, the Allegheny County (Penn.) Bar Association permitted two
branches of the same legal aid office to represent a child and an adverse parent in a
child deprivation case, provided that the attorneys did not share offices and main-
tained separate files. Ethical Considerations of Separate Legal Services Attorneys
Representing Parent and Child in Deprived Child Proceedings, 7 CLEARINGHOUSE
REV. 194 (1973). The Boston Bar has permitted attorneys from separate offices of the
Greater Boston Legal Services to represent opposing sides in litigation matters, with
court approval and client consent, when diligent efforts could not locate alternative
counsel to represent the opposing party. See Boston Bar Ass'n Comm. on Ethics,
Op. 76-2 (1976).
1148
CONFLICT OF INTEREST
usually lack the fiscal ability to properly effectuate putative wall require-
ments.
Although there are no cases directly analyzing the efficacy of the Wall in
the legal aid setting, two recent decisions, Cheng v. GAF Corp.1 34 and
Yaretsky v. Blum, 13 suggest that courts may be reluctant to permit the use
of the Chinese Wall by legal aid offices when they are small in size, as most
are. Although the Cheng case was subsequently vacated on procedural
grounds by the United States Supreme Court, 13 6 and its precedential value is
thus doubtful, the opinion remains persuasive as authority on the area of
substantive law that it addresses. 13 7 In Cheng, a legal aid attorney whose
agency represented an indigent plaintiff in an age discrimination suit, ob-
tained new employment with the firm that represented the defendant in that
suit. The attorney worked exclusively in a department of the firm that had no
contact with the case. In disqualifying the attorney and law firm from
representing the defendant, the Second Circuit held that the screening pro-
cedures instituted by the law firm, which was comprised of only thirty
attorneys, could not eliminate the danger that the attorney in question might
intentionally transmit confidential information. 138
This judicial skepticism over the effectiveness of the Chinese Wall solu-
tion in small firms was reconfirmed by the United States District Court for
the Southern District of New York in Yaretsky v. Blum, 139 a case involving
the same attorney. In Yaretsky, however, the attorney had been directly
involved in the case when employed by legal aid, 40 and later worked in
the law firm department that handled the defendant's case. 141 The court was
not convinced that isolating the attorney and locking up all files would be
134 631 F.2d 1052 (2d Cir. 1980), vacated, 450 U.S. 903 (1981).
525 F. Supp. 24 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
136 The case was vacated because of a lack of subject matter jurisdiction in
accordance with Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risjord, 449 U.S. 368 (1981). See
supra note 127.
137 Yaretsky, 525 F. Supp. at 27 ("[T]he Supreme Court's judgment in vacating the
Cheng judgment should not be interpreted as a decision on the merits.").
18 Cheng, 631 F.2d at 1058. The plaintiff alleged that although the attorney in
question had not represented him in the legal aid office, he had actual knowledge of
client confidences. Id. at 1054. The attorney testified that he had not discussed the
case with anyone at the firm. Id. at 1057.
See also Greitzer & Locks v. Johns-Manville Corp., No. 81-1379 (4th Cir. Mar. 5,
1982), vacated, 681 F.2d 813 (en banc), cert. denied, 51 U.S.L.W. 3363 (U.S. Nov. 8,
1982); Arkansas v. Dean Food Prods. Co., 605 F.2d 380, 387 (8th Cir. 1979) (noting
"understanding and expectation [of the general public and bar] . . . that general
discussions of firm business is the norm in small law firms"); Cardinale v. Golinello,
43 N.Y.2d 288, 372 N.E.2d 26, 401 N.Y.S.2d 191 (1977) (disqualification of attorney,
inter alia, because of "cross current of discussion and ideas" among attorneys in
small firm).
139 525 F. Supp. 24 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
140 Id. at 27. The attorney had no personal contact with the plaintiffs when he was
employed by the legal aid office. id.
141 Id. at 30.
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sufficient to provide adequate screening given the small size of the office. 142
The court noted that "the relatively small group of professional colleagues
with whom [the attorney] interacts on a daily basis is [sic] also the group of
people who must screen their activities from [him], and who must, in turn,
be screened from [his] disclosure, however inadvertent, of confidential
information .... ,,143 As legal aid programs are generally small in size,
courts thus may be reluctant to permit offices to represent conflicted indi-
gents even if screening mechanisms are put in place.
Some courts have permitted dual representation despite their uncertain-
ties about the effectiveness of screening mechanisms when important public
policies would be vindicated by permitting such representation. Law firms
that employ former government attorneys, for example, have been shown
special solicitude in many Chinese Wall cases,' 44 because of concerns that
disqualification would discourage attorneys from accepting public employ-
ment during their careers. This reasoning arguably could be extended to
matters involving legal aid attorneys, because of their special position as
attorney of last resort for the poor. Special exceptions should not be made,
however, at the expense of the fiduciary relationship between legal aid
attorneys and their clients. The fiduciary principle is so central to the
legitimacy of the judicial system that no policy justification can be advanced
that would outweigh the need to preserve this relationship. The nature of a
legal aid attorney's employment should not dictate whether traditional
conflicts rules should apply. 45
B. Avoiding Conflicts Constraints Within the Framework of Traditional
Doctrine
Given the practical difficulties in effectuating a Chinese Wall in legal aid
offices that will adequately protect the fiduciary relationship between legal
aid lawyer and client, it might be thought that the special obligation to
conflicted clients cannot be met without deviating from traditional conflicts
rules. Uncompromised representation can be provided to conflicted clients,
however, if the staff attorney approach to legal service distribution is re-
142 Id. at 29-30.
143 Id. at 30.
144 Armstrong v. McAlpin, 625 F.2d 433, 442-44 (2d Cir. 1980) (en banc), vacated,
449 U.S. 1106 (1981). The Code of Professional Responsibility established restric-
tions on the ability of a government attorney to participate in matters in which he had
substantial responsibility once he or she accepts employment in a private capacity.
MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 9-101(B) (1979).
14- See People v. Shinkle, 51 N.Y.2d 417, 421-22, 415 N.E.2d 909, 910-11, 434
N.Y.S.2d 918, 919-20 (1980) (requiring appointment of special prosecutor to repre-
sent state whenever defendant represented by legal aid office formerly headed by
present Chief Assistant District Attorney). The court recognized that this require-
ment might "impede the transfer of attorneys between offices of Legal Aid or Public
Defender and of District Attorney," but would not compromise the fiduciary prin-
ciple in fact or appearance. Id. at 421; 415 N.E.2d at 910; 434 N.YS.2d at 919.
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structured to allow some private sector involvement. 146 Private sector par-
ticipation will add flexibility to legal aid distribution, and form the basis of a
satisfactory resolution to the conflicts dilemma.
1. Court Appointment of Counsel
All conflicted indigents could receive adequate representation if legal aid
lawyers were able to secure legal counsel for these individuals from sources
outside of and independent from the legal aid office. One solution would be
for legal aid offices to request that courts appoint counsel in all cases in
which a conflicted indigent would otherwise be left unrepresented. Such
appointments were the method by which poor persons historically received
legal assistance. 147 The decision to appoint counsel is left to the trial court's
discretion. Although courts generally look to the circumstances and com-
plexity of a lawsuit in determining whether to appoint counsel, they rarely
articulate the criteria upon which appointment decisions are based. Since the
right to counsel in civil cases is limited, 148 appointments are usually reserved
for criminal cases. Few courts have based appointment decisions on the
existence of conflicts of interest. 149
Mandatory appointment of counsel may not ensure that conflicted indi-
146 But see Developments, supra note 1, at 1409 (advocating the Chinese Wall
solution).
147 As early as 1713 in New York and 1721 in Maryland, attorneys were assigned
to represent plaintiffs in civil court without a fee. SELECT CASES OF THE MAYOR'S
COURT OF NEW YORK 1674-1784, 176 (Morris ed. 1935); PROCEEDINGS OF THE
MARYLAND COURT OF APPEALS 1695-1729, 303 (Bond ed. 1933); see Patterson, Laws
of N.J. 339 (1800), cited in S. MOORE, RELIEF OF INDIGENTS FROM FINANCIAL
BARRIERS TO EQUAL JUSTICE IN AMERICAN CIVIL COURTS 3 & n.18 (1971) (requiring
appointment of counsel in civil and criminal cases).
148 In some instances, courts have found constitutional implications in an indi-
gent's claim to counsel in civil cases. See, e.g., Payne v. Superior Court, 17 Cal. 3d
908, 920, 553 P.2d 565, 573, 132 Cal. Rptr. 405, 413 (1976) (indigent prisoner sued for
civil damages and unable to defend pro se has right to counsel). See generally
Besharov, Terminating Parental Rights: The Indigent Parent's Right to Counsel
After Lassiter v. North Carolina, 15 FAM. L.Q. 205, 217 (1981) (Lassiter a cautious
expansion of due process to include right to counsel in civil suits); Note, The Right to
Counsel in Civil Litigation, 66 COLUM. L. REV. 1322, 1329-36 (1966) (advocating
right to counsel for indigent parties in civil suits); Note, The Emerging Right of Legal
Assistance for the Indigent in Civil Proceedings, 9 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 554, 562-68
(1976) (right to counsel limited to actions involving fundamental rights); Note, The
Indigent's Right to Counsel in Civil Cases, 76 YALE L.J. 545, 547-51 (1967) (due
process and equal protection implications of right to counsel).
149 The New York Court of Appeals has suggested, however, that "conflict of
interest problems are taken up by the discretionary assignment of uncompensated
counsel." Matter of Smiley, 36 N.Y.2d 433, 439, 330 N.E.2d 53, 56, 369 N.Y.S.2d 87,
91 (1975); see also Tobak v. Mojika, N.Y.L. J., May 16, 1973, at 20, col. 3 (appoint-
ment made because of conflict between clients of the same legal aid organization).
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gents are zealously represented. Unlike pro bono programs, which rely on
the generosity of attorneys who voluntarily provide services, 50 appointment
schemes create a mandatory obligation on attorneys. This obligation is
idiosyncratic, if not arbitrary, since it is limited exclusively to those called
upon by the judge to serve.' 5 1 Most court appointment schemes are uncom-
pensated, and force attorneys to respond under compulsion and often at
inopportune times.15 2 A few courts have held that it is unconstitutional to
compel attorneys to render uncompensated legal counsel to indigent civil
litigants,1 13 although the majority have upheld the constitutionality of this
method of providing legal assistance to the poor. 54 The fear of exacerbating
pro bono caseloads for the private bar, and perhaps compromising the
quality of representation, has generally created a bias against establishing
formal appointment schemes.' 55
15o The view that legal aid for the poor should flow from the "spontaneous charity
of individuals" has long been a traditional approach to the problem. See M. CAPPEL-
LETTI, J. GORDLEY & E. JOHNSON, TOWARD EQUAL JUSTICE: A COMPARATIVE
STUDY OF LEGAL AID IN MODERN SOCIETIES 11 (1975). In recent years the Amer-
ican legal profession has debated whether this obligation is individual, professional,
voluntary, or mandatory. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
Canon 2 (1979) (lawyers should asist the legal profession in fullfilling its duty to make
legal counsel available); see also id. EC 2-16, 2-25. The idea that this obligation
should be mandatory was proposed in the Kutak Commission discussion draft but
was withdrawn in the final version of the Model Code. See MODEL RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 6.1 (Proposed Final Draft 1981); Slonim, Kutak Panel
Report: No Mandatory Pro Bono, 67 A.B.A.J. 33 (1981). See generally Christensen,
The Lawyer's Pro Bono Publico Responsibility, 1981 A.B.F. RES. J. 1; Rosenfeld,
Mandatory Pro Bono: Historical and Constitutional Perspectives, 2 CARDOZO L.
REV. 255 (1981); Shapiro, The Enigma of the Lawyer's Duty To Serve, 55 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 735 (1981).
"IS Under the common law rule, when an attorney was appointed he could not
refuse to serve without good reason. See Weatherby v. Pittmann, 24 Ga. App. 452,
453-54, 101 S.E. 131, 132 (1919).
52 In Missouri, attorneys have resisted such uncompensated appointments even
at the cost of contempt citations. Ostroff, Missouri Remains Unable To Pay Indi-
gents' Counsel: Pro Bono Revolt Grows, Nat'l L. J., May 11, 1981, at 2; see State ex
rel. Wolff v. Ruddy, 617 S.W.2d 64 (Mo. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1142 (1982).
See generally Ranu, The Criminal Defense Crisis, Nat'l L.J., Apr. 26, 1982, at 1.
M5 See, e.g., Williamson v. Vardeman, 674 F.2d 1211, 1215-16 (8th Cir. 1982)
(forced appointments without compensation unconstitutional); State v. Bell, 244 Ind.
701, 704-05, 195 N.E.2d 464, 466 (1964) (violation of state constitution); Bradshaw v.
Ball, 487 S.W.2d 294, 298-99 (Ct. App. Ky. 1972) (violation of state and federal
Constitution); State v. Green, 470 S.W.2d 571, 573 (Mo. 1971) (violation of state
constitution); Bedford v. Salt Lake County, 22 Utah 2d 12, 14-15, 447 P.2d 193,
194-95 (1968) (civil appointments without fee unconstitutional while criminal assign-
ments are not).
154 See generally Note, Court Appointment of Attorneys in Civil Cases: The
Constitutionality of Uncompensated Legal Assistance, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 366,
370-90 (1981) (citing cases).
155 In one New York case in which over a hundred divorce defendants requested
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Even if courts could be persuaded to appoint counsel routinely in civil
suits, non-compensating appointment schemes cannot provide indigents
with enough legal counsel to satisfy their legal needs. Although courts may
have temporary success with their efforts to dragoon attorneys into mass
appointment programs, these efforts may also generate ill-will among mem-
bers of the bar. 15 6 Appointment schemes thus may be difficult to sustain over
long periods of time. Moreover, many attorneys lack competence in trial
litigation and cannot effectively provide the type of legal assistance that
conflicted clients need. The burden thus may be too great for the trial bar
alone to bear.
2. Lawyer Referral Programs
Efforts to increase public access to legal services often concentrate on the
development and operation of lawyer referral services. 5 7 Under a referral
scheme, individuals who seek legal assistance may contact their local bar
association referral service to obtain the name of an attorney with whom
they can consult for a nominal fee. Many programs supplement their
regular referral schemes with a low or no-fee component for legal services
for indigents. Indeed, referral programs in Chicago,"58 Washington, D.C.,15 9
and Louisville, Kentucky 160 require each participating attorney to accept at
counsel, the State court rejected the plea as impracticable. In re Smiley, 36 N.Y.2d
433, 440-43, 330 N.E.2d 53, 57-58, 369 N.Y.S.2d 87, 92-94 (1975); see also State v.
Rush, 46 N.J. 399, 217 A.2d 441 (1966). However, recent cutbacks in funding for
legal aid services have caused at least one judge and one bar association to require
pro bono assignments in civil cases. The El Paso, Texas Bar Association has required
all lawyers in the county to accept two pro bono cases annually. See D. Berreby, Pro
Bono Mandated for El Paso Lawyers, Nat'l. L. J., Oct. 11, 1982, at 2, col. 1. The
Westchester Supreme Court in Westchester, New York, has begun assigning counsel
in domestic relations cases, requiring every member of the county's domestic rela-
tions bar to accept one case per year. See Court Assigns 'Pro Bono' Aid in DRL
Actions, N.Y.L.J., Feb. 17, 1982 at 1, col. 4.
156 Some of the unhappiness can be seen in the vigor of the commentators.
See, e.g., Hunter, Slave Labor in the Courts-A Suggested Solution, 74 CASE AND
COMMENT 3 (July-Aug. 1969); Popper, Forced Labor Without Apology, 37 J. Mo.
BAR 446 (1981); Williams & Bost, The Assigned Counsel System: An Exercise of
Servitude?, 42 Miss. L.J. 32, 38 (1971); Comment, The Uncompensated Appointed
Counsel System: A Constitutional and Social Transgression, 60 Ky. L.J. 710 (1972).
151 See Carlin, The Advancing State of the Art of Lawyer Referral Service, 30
BAYLOR L. REV. 643, 643-47(1978); Christensen, Toward Improved Legal Service
Delivery: A Look at Four Mechanisms, 1979 A.B.F. RES. J. 277, 286-89.
"' The Chicago bar requires referral panels to take some no-fee cases. N. LEVIN
& J. STEIGER, To LIGHT ONE CANDLE: A HANDBOOK FOR ORGANIZING, FUNDING
AND MAINTAINING PUBLIC SERVICE ACTIVITIES 38 (1978).
159 The District of Columbia Lawyer Referral and Information Service requires
that each of its participating attorneys agrees to accept at least one pro bono or no-fee
case per year. Carlin, supra note 157, at 656.
160 Bardenwerper, LRIS Report, 2 LoUISVILLE LAWYER 38, 39-40 (1981); see also
1982] 1153
BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 62: 1115
least one pro bono case each year, tying fee-generating referrals to legal
services work.16
The private bar has demonstrated a willingness to participate informally in
conflict of interest matters.' 62 In a few regions, conflicted indigents are
referred through no-fee panels established by local bar associations. 163 Some
legal aid organizations also have established pro bono conflicts panels that
are supported by the local bar.164 Not all referral schemes contain pro bono
components, however. Bar associations usually develop referral programs
primarily to provide information about sources of representation to paying
clients who are the victims of communication or market failure.
The Legal Services Corporation has initiated a major drive to develop pro
bono panels and other forms of private bar involvement in the delivery of
legal services to the poor. 65 In 1982, the Corporation required each legal aid
W. Bardenwerper, The Louisville Model: An Evaluation of the Experimental Lawyer
Referral and Information Services Project in Louisville, Kentucky 10 (ABA 1982); D.
Bricking, A Report on the American Bar Association Sponsored Lawyer Referral and
Information Service in Louisville, Kentucky and The Legal Aid Society, Inc. 4 (Legal
Serv. Corp., Delivery Research Unit, Apr. 1981).
16' This tie-in arrangement has been approved by the American Bar Association.
See ABA Standing Comm. on Lawyer Referral Serv., Statement of Standards and
Practices for a Lawyer Referral Service Rule 3.3 (Feb. 1978). Indeed, the Superior
Court of the District of Columbia requires family lawyers to accept pro bono rep-
resentation of parents in child neglect cases as a condition to receiving paying
appointments to represent children charged with acts of delinquency or charged with
being in need of supervision under the Criminal Justice Act. See Family Division
Trial Lawyers of the Superior Court of the District of Columbia, Inc. v. Moultrie,
Civ. No. 82-1373 (D.D.C. Dec. 20, 1982).
162 D. Bricking, supra note 160, at 1-2 n-4.
163 See Memo, Lawyer Referral and Conflict of Interest Systems (Land of Lincoln
Legal Assistance Foundation, May 11, 1978).
164 See Letter from Charles E.K. Vasaly, Exec. Dir., Legal Services of Northern
Virginia, to Professor Marshall Breger (June 30, 1982) (discussing such a program
established by two branches of the Legal Services Office of Northern Virginia). In
the first six months of 1982, both branches screened about 1200 applicants for client
eligibility. Six hundred and fifteen were accepted as clients. Of this number, 19 or
about 1.5% were referred to the conflicts panel. Id. Because pro bono panels are
available, cases are sent out if there is the slightest doubt about the legal service
office handling an applicant. Id.
Similar policies are informally used in the Tidewater, Virginia program. Over 40
attorneys participate in a Conflict of Interest Panel, with most agreeing to take one
case per year. The conflicts cases are primarily domestic relations matters, including
divorce and child custody issues. Landlord-tenant and consumer problems are also
referred. The program represents the first client requesting service. About 2-3 cases
are referred each month. See Memo, TLAS Pro Bono Referral Systems (unpub-
lished) accompanying Letter from Linda Pederson to Marshall Breger (Aug. 17,
1982).
165 Nearly 100 programs have used private lawyers in pro bono efforts through
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organization to devote 10% of its annual grant to the development and
support of programs involving the private bar in the delivery of services. 66
These funds can be used to develop Legal Services-sponsored referral
schemes as well as other forms of private sector involvement.
Although referral schemes can be a useful tool in resolving the conflicts
dilemma, such schemes alone will not sufficiently meet the needs of all
conflicted indigents. 67 It is highly unlikely that referral programs will have
the capacity to accommodate all conflicted indigents. Even if the needs of all
indigents could be met, however, there is no guarantee that conflicted clients
will receive representation. Lawyers who participate in referral programs
are generally under no obligation to accept indigent clients. Conflicted indi-
gents will thus receive legal aid as a matter of grace, while their adversaries
will be provided representation as a matter of entitlement.
3. Referral to Another Legal Aid Office
When two independent legal aid societies exist in one locality 68 or in two
geographically contiguous communities, 69 an exchange program can be
1980. 1980 Legal Services Corp. Ann. Rep. 8. The Corporation has provided special
grants to local bar associations and legal services offices to create pro bono pro-
grams. See id. at 27.
166 See 46 Fed. Reg. 61,017, 61,018 (1981). Referral schemes do not seem to be the
major avenue of private bar involvement. As of October 29, 1982, 245 of the 292 basic
field grantees had reported on their efforts to comply with the 10% requirement. Two
hundred and one programs were engaged in organized pro bono work, 56 in judicare
programs, 100 in contracts with private attorneys, and 72 were using direct delivery
models. Legal Services Corporation, Private Attorney Involvement: Directions for
1983 and Beyond 4 (Nov. 23, 1982). Referral services were included in the "other"
category. Id. at 28 n.2.
167 In the legal aid context, an attorney should be permitted to refer a client
directly to another attorney and should not be required to refer a conflicted client to a
referral panel only. Without such a rule, an indigent would be denied an alternative
source of counsel merely because no referral panel existed. An indigent who cannot
receive legal aid should be referred to a specific pro bono volunteer should one be
available. See Alaska Bar Ass'n Comm. on Ethics, Op. 78-5 (1978); ABA Comm. of
Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Informal Op. 1334 (1976).
168 Cities with two legal aid organizations include New York, Chicago, and Buffalo
among others. Most cities lack two societies. Over time, United-Way funded pro-
grams have closed down or amalgamated with Legal Services Corporation programs.
The Chicago situation is unusual in that the United Way program merged with and
then "divorced" program funded by the Office of Economic Opportunity. See
J. KATZ, supra note 70, at 135.
169 With the expansion of the Corporation into all areas of the country, this
solution is no longer possible only in populated areas. In Lakeland, Florida, for
example, Florida Rural Legal Services, Inc. declined to represent a tenant of the
Lakeland Housing Authority in an eviction proceeding because such representation
would conflict with the prior representation of another tenant whose fight with the
conflicted tenant led to the eviction. The problem was solved when the Polk County
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developed for referring conflicted clients to offices where conflicts will not
exist. Since each program is essentially a separate firm, such exchanges
would be permissible. 170 The conflicts dilemma could be alleviated if legal
aid programs accepted responsibility for such referrals.
A two-office exchange will clearly be feasible when the offices belong to
separately organized legal aid programs. 17 1 The approach may prove unac-
ceptable when both offices belong to one legal services organization, particu-
larly if the relationship of the offices extends beyond solely administrative
matters.1 72 Although it is possible that an adequate Chinese Wall can be
constructed to separate the offices, such screening mechanisms may not
always be successful. 17 3 Of course, many geographic communities do not
have two independent legal aid societies, and may not even have two
autonomous offices.
Office exchanges also raise significant problems in cases involving group
representation. Local programs that attain house counsel status for com-
munity groups will be unable to accept conflicted clients if their interests
conflict with those of the group they represent. This may substantially limit
the opportunity for organized exchanges.
Legal Aid Society agreed to take the case. See Letter from Gerald Caplan, Acting
Pres., Legal Services Corp., to Senator Lawton Chiles (June 2, 1982).
170 See Kelly v. Kelly, [1972-1974 Transfer Binder] Pov. L. REP. (CCH) 17,599
(Pa. Ct. of C.P., Del. County 1972) (ordering legal aid office to obtain "other
competent counsel" to represent one of parties in contested divorce).
Although it is theoretically possible for programs in contiguous cities to exchange
conflicts cases, it is unlikely, given the scarcity of resources, that program directors
will agree to accept such cases before those from their own community. A legal aid
office may, of course, be willing to accept conflicts from neighboring communities if
its own conflicts will be accepted on a reciprocal basis.
'"' One legal aid organization in New York City, the Community Action for Legal
Services (CALS), attempted to resolve its conflicts problems by requesting that one
of its constituent organizations represent adverse conflicted clients who otherwise
would be unrepresented because of conflict of interest proscriptions. See Letter from
Marttie L. Thompson, General Counsel, Community Action for Legal Services, to
Rabbi Joseph Langer, Executive Director, United Jewish Counsel of the Lower East
Side, Inc. (Mar. 18, 1977). That policy is still in effect. Constituent agencies are not
required to intervene, however. Id. Yet, the question of whether such constituent
organizations are sufficiently independent from the CALS to justify dual representa-
tion must be raised. See ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility,
Informal Op. 1309 (1979) (two legal aid organizations funded by same governmental
source operated as separate law firms when no exchange of personnel or information,
and no controlling or supervisory relationship).
172 Cf. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Informal Op. 1309
(1979) (no conflict where two offices had no such relationship).
"I See supra notes 122-145 and accompanying text.
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4. Hiring Outside Counsel: The Judicare Option
The most comprehensive solution to the conflicts dilemma would require
the institutionalization of a program to hire outside counsel to represent
conflicted clients who are otherwise eligible for legal aid. Some legal aid
programs are already using federal funds to hire outside counsel' 7 4 to solve
conflicts problems. 175 A number of programs contract with outside counsel
on a regular basis. 176 This practice is, of course, a partial application of the
judicare approach to legal aid allocation. 77 In a judicare system, govern-
ment subsidies are provided to private sector attorneys who offer direct legal
assistance to poor persons. The subsidies are based on a fee schedule which,
although unlikely to parallel market prices, provides a sufficient incentive to
general practitioners to participate in the program. The judicare approach is
widely used in England and other countries. 178
The judicare approach to providing legal services to the poor has caused
considerable controversy within the legal services community. Indeed, the
concept of "pure" judicare raises a variety of problems for structuring a
legal services delivery system. These problems include concern over quality
control, cost, 17 9 and attorney availability. Regardless of the validity of these
114 This practice, unlike that of referring clients on a no-fee basis to attorneys not
formally affiliated with the legal services program, recognizes the legitimacy of
departing from the staff attorney system to fulfill societal commitments to the poor.
175 A survey conducted by the author revealed that as of 1977, 28.3% of all
responding legal aid programs considered hiring outside counsel and that 15.7%, or
21 programs, did so. A few programs took the position that they should represent
neither client if it was impossible to ensure representation for both. See Survey,
supra note 2.
176 Some programs have even extended their hiring of outside counsel beyond the
conflicts context to provide expertise for specialized legal work such as bankruptcy
and probate proceedings, see D. Bricking, supra note 160, at 2 n.6, or for complex
litigation.
Conflicts can also exist in nonlitigation contexts. Twenty per cent of the respond-
ing offices admitted to having acted as draftsmen for parties with actual or potential
differing interests. Often the drafting conflicts occur in the writing of or lobbying for
legislation, in the preparation of administrative regulations, in the preparation of
divorce documents, or in the drawing up of real estate agreements. See Survey,
supra note 2.
177 See S. BRAKEL, JUDICARE: PUBLIC FUNDS, PRIVATE LAWYERS AND POOR
PEOPLE (1974) (reviewing Wisconsin program); Brakel, Judicare in West Virginia, 65
A.B.A.J. 1346 (1979); Martin, Judicare: One Component of a Diversified Delivery
System, 15 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 500 (1981) (describing West Virginia plan).
178 See S. POLLOCK, LEGAL AID: THE FIRST 25 YEARS (1975). A critical assess-
ment of this scheme appears in J. Cooper, supra note 130, at 24-56.
Although the proponents ofjudicare have argued that the system maximizes client
satisfaction by providing freedom of choice in legal representation, it is unlikely that
this feature of judicare is relevant if its application is limited to conflicts cases.
179 Presentjudicare fees in Wisconsin, for example, are $30.00 per hour. There is a
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concerns, they should not be relied on to impede efforts to create private
attorney supplements to legal service programs for accommodating
conflicted clients. The judicare option mitigates the risk of inadequate rep-
resentation resulting from compelled representation which may exist under
lawyer referral or appointment schemes. Since otherwise independent law-
yers or firms provide services directly to indigent clients, this approach also
avoids any reliance on potentially faulty screening devices. Further, finan-
cial concerns alone should not outweigh the government's duty to represent
the conflicted client. °8 0 Private attorney supplements for conflicts purposes
can serve as experiments for examining how private attorneys can be used
most effectively within the general legal services context.
The hiring of outside counsel may not eliminate conflicts situations in all
cases, since attorneys may be unwilling to vigorously oppose the legal aid
societies that hired them. 1 8 1 A number of structural mechanisms can be
created to restrict administrative control of outside counsel by the legal
services agency. Local programs can establish conflicts funds which can be
administered by local bar associations or lawyer referral panels to ensure
that the legal aid office does not control the outside counsel. Several law
firms can be placed on retainer to provide conflicts representation.,8 2 A
federal conflict of interest fund can also be created to pay for outside counsel
$500.00 maximum per case which can be waived. Divorces and bankruptcies are paid
for on a flat fee basis. WISCONSIN JUDICARE PARTICIPATING ATTORNEY'S HAND-
BOOK 8-9 (Jan. 1982). Most judicare programs utilize some staff support system, and
even the English system, long the exemplar of the private attorney approach, con-
tains a salaried attorney approach.
The dispute over comparative cost structures has been a dispute over how over-
head should be included in the wage rate and what a "case" means for purposes of
cost per case. Although the subject is still open, the Legal Services Corporation, in
its own delivery system study, did find that "private attorney projects, as a group,
are not greatly higher or lower in cost than the staff attorney model." Legal Services
Corporation, The Delivery Systems Study: A Policy Report to the Congress and the
President of the United States A-96 (June 1980) [hereinafter cited as Delivery
Systems Study].
180 See supra note 109 and accompanying text.
181 Conflicts of interest may also exist in the judicare context. For example, a
lawyer retained by a local bank cannot be expected to handle clients who have
collection activity complaints against the bank. See J. MARTIN, PRIVATE ATTORNEY
INVOLVEMENT IN RURAL LEGAL SERVICES DELIVERY (Delivery Research Unit,
Legal Services Corporation, October 1982). In such a situation, a private attorney
"might be urged to accept a compromised resolution" to the dispute. Id. at 13.
Multi-county judicare programs have responded to this concern by referring
conflicted clients to private attorneys in adjacent counties. The Minnesota judicare
program takes this approach. See Swanson, A Close Look at Two Programs,
NLADA BRIEFCASE 104, 110 (November 1980).
182 See, e.g., Mass. Bar Ass'n Comm. on Professional Ethics, Op. 79-5 (1979)
(referral agency established by Legal Services Corporation to direct indigents to one
of eleven private law firms paid by Legal Services Corporation).
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when local programs certify that conflicts exist. That a local legal aid pro-
gram has contracted with the private attorney who provides a conflicted
indigent with representation need not create any concern about the attor-
ney's autonomy.
Similarly, no impropriety should result in either appearance or fact from
the realization that these private referrals are funded by the Legal Services
Corporation, which also supports the legal aid office that represents the
other party to the conflict.183 ABA Informal Opinion 1309 states clearly that
where administrative control of two legal service providers is separate,
funding may be derived from a common source. 84 If the existence of
common funding were sufficient to require disqualification, a legal aid office
in one city could not represent a client who sued a defendant in a city
thousands of miles away. 85 Legal aid offices could contract with attorneys
on a salaried or retainer basis to handle conflict referrals. In urban areas, the
use of pre-paid legal insurance might well prove expedient. 8 6 Some use of
the judicare option will enable many conflicted clients to obtain the legal
representation that they require.
This approach will also eliminate many of the problems surrounding group
representation. The use of the judicare option enables legal aid programs to
represent groups in intracommunity disputes without depriving adverse
community interests of effective representation. It further ensures that legal
services programs do not associate themselves with one section of the
poverty community at the expense of heterogeneous sectors of the poor.
The relationship between the outside attorney and the legal aid agency
must be carefully structured to ensure that the conflicted client is truly the
client of the supplementing private attorney and not of the legal aid program
itself. The "whose client" issue becomes more problematic when legal aid
183 But see Mo. Bar Ass'n Ethics Comm., Informal Op. 12 (Aug. 31, 1979)
(referral impermissible where judicare attorney paid directly by legal services
agency). A legal aid program may appoint two judicare attorneys to represent
opposing sides in a dispute. See Mass. Bar Ass'n Comm. on Professional Ethics, Op.
79-5 (1979).
184 ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Informal Op. 1309
(1975).
185 See discussion of referrals to other legal aid agencies, supra notes 168-173 and
accompanying text. The Multinomah, Washington legal services program has in-
stitutionalized a program that refers conflicted clients to private lawyers. The
attorneys must agree to a fee schedule established by the program. Over 95% of the
cases handled are domestic relations cases. Description of the Multinomah Bar Ass'n
DSS Demonstration Project at 2. Positional conflicts occasionally were referred to
the panel as well. Id. at 5. This program thus utilizes a judicare supplement to the
traditional staff attorney program. See Delivery Systems Study, supra note 179, at
A-7.
186 See Delivery Systems Study, supra note 179, at A-28; R. Kramer, Norwalk
Demonstration Project (December 1977) (prepaid legal insurance offered for all cases
as part of Delivery Systems Study).
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programs receive confidential information at initial intakes, workup cases
prior to referrals, or maintain quality control follow-ups on cases that are
referred. Care should be taken to see that legal aid offices refer conflicted
indigents as soon as potential conflicts surface, to ensure that confidential
information is not disclosed. Once the organizational relationship between
the staff attorney program and the private supplement is carefully worked
out to avoid ethical violations, the judicare option provides an effective and
comprehensive solution to the conflicts dilemma.' 87
VI. CONCLUSION
Conflict of interest rules are designed to protect the fiduciary relationship
between lawyer and client by preserving client confidences and ensuring
untrammeled loyalty. The legal aid attorney's special position as lawyer of
last resort to the poor, and the scarcity of resources inherent in this period of
economic contraction have created pressures to reinterpret conflict of inter-
est constraints in the legal aid setting. The nonprofit nature of legal aid
practice reinforces the belief that special rules can be developed for legal aid
practice without compromising ethical values.
This Article has argued that conflict of interest constraints cannot be
relaxed in the legal aid context without endangering traditional values of
client loyalty and fidelity. Reaffirming traditional ethical constraints does not
necessitate abandoning conflicted yet eligible clients who seek legal assis-
tance. Once a legal services program agrees to represent one party in a
dispute, however, the program has a responsibility to ensure representation
for conflicted indigent parties. This obligation may in rare cases be fulfilled
by the legal aid office itself, if adequate screening methods can be developed
to protect the confidences of the client. Most often, legal aid offices will have
to seek assistance from the private bar in order to satisfy this ethical
responsibility. Federal funds can be used to hire outside counsel to represent
clients whom the legal aid office itself cannot represent. The conflicts di-
lemma can thus be resolved without compromising the fiduciary relationship
between attorney and client, and without rejecting the special respon-
sibilities of legal aid lawyers, the attorneys of last resort for the poverty
community.
187 To the extent that legal aid lawyers view their enterprise as distinguishable
from private sector lawyering, they may oppose the use of private attorneys to serve
the poor. Although often cloaked in the garb of efficiency claims, opposition to the
judicare option has been largely ideological in tenor. See Bellow, supra note 63, at
337. Judicare attorneys were deemed suspect insofar as they were prejudged as
lacking sufficient sympathy and committment to the needs of the poor. Although the
legal aid community may have changed its articulated position in this regard, arguing
that there is no longer room for a "we-they" approach by either legal services or the
private bar, NLADA and ABA Perspectives: Legal Services and the Private Bar 1982
and Beyond 5 (remarks of Steven Lowenstein), antipathy still exists. This antipathy
should not affect the decision to employ members of the private sector to alleviate the
impact of the conflicts dilemma on legal aid distribution.
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